lets us behind the scenes, in however slight a degree, is full of interest. Pre-eminently musical as Milton's lines constantly are, we are not dealing in his case with one, where, as with Shelley, we have music and not much behind the music. Not even Shelley has surpassed in melody the lyrical parts of "Comus," yet who would maintain that in the "Comus" there are not expressed some of the noblest thoughts of which language is capable; or that beneath the quaint fancies of "Lycidas" there do not lie the idea of the tenderest and noblest affection?

ROBERT SINKER.

ART. IV.—SACRIFICE AND COVENANT.

SACRIFICE was common to the great mass of nations, to heathens as well as to that under the special care of God, whose history is given in the Scriptures. It will therefore be necessary, in order to establish a satisfactory basis for a theory, which shall account for and explain the principles of sacrifice in general, to review the salient points of other sacrifices besides those recorded in the Old Testament. To me the true theory appears to be that the grand principle of sacrifice is one of *representation*, not one of *substitution*, the latter being but an inadequate approximation to the former, which both includes and supersedes it.

Let us begin with a matter that has been very carefully and closely investigated, in which the representative character of sacrifice has been brought out in comparatively recent times in a most clear and convincing manner.

There were two modes in which the homicide in Greece averted the penalty of blood for blood. One was by servitude, by becoming a slave, a chattel instead of a man; and here C. O. Müller remarks (on the "Eumenides" of Æschylus, *Hilasmoi* and *Katharmoi*) "that the circumstance that the Œchalian chieftain Eurytus, the father of the slain Iphitus, receives the money paid for the redemption of the slayer, Hercules, is a plain indication that the servitude represents a surrender of the life [of the slayer]." "The other mode consists in the substitution of a victim, symbolically denoting the surrender of the man's own life. . . . But in expiation for blood we find among the old Greeks the widely-diffused rite, whereby the ram represents the human being; as the goat among the Jews, so the ram among the Greeks and kindred Italic races was the principal sin-offering. The very ancient Minyan legends concerning the Athamantiades, which have been so

profoundly investigated in later times, turn entirely upon the human sacrifice demanded by the wrathful Zeus Laphystios, and the ram substituted in its place. A ram is the principal offering at all oracles of the dead, the ceremonies of which closely agree with those of expiation for blood; their object usually was to pacify the souls beneath the earth. Black rams and sheep were the customary sacrifices to the dead in Greece. Now, it was a very ancient Roman usage, and, as we are told upon the occasion, an Athenian usage also, that in a case of unintentional homicide (*si telum fugit magis quam jecit*) a ram, as a vicarial substitute for the head of the slain, was given (*aries subjiciebatur*) to the Agnati or ἀγχιστεῖς, on whom the duty of avenging blood immediately devolved.[1] This was one of the peace-offerings on the return of the homicide, which are denoted by the term ὁσιοῦσθαι, and are distinguished from the καθαίρεσθαι, the rites of purification. 'For the head of the *slain*,' say our authorities; for which we would put, 'For the head of the *slayer*.' For, as is shown by the legend concerning the race of Athamas, which was preserved from the sacrificial death by the substitution of a ram, this animal, as a sin-offering, takes the place of man, even in cases where there was no slain to be appeased. Besides, it would be very strange if the slain, whose Erinnys is the chief thing to be pacified, received a brute victim as the vicarial representative of his own life. On the contrary, it is clear that the ram was given for the man's life, precisely as, in the case before explained, the ransom paid over to the family of the slain, as the price of the slayer, represented the slayer."

Now, all this is perfectly plain and consistent, but Müller entirely departs from the theory so well developed and elucidated with regard to sacrifices of purification and atonement, when he proceeds to the "sacrificial procedures used with oath-takings and covenants, in which the slaying and dismembering of the victim has always been understood as a symbol of the fate that shall overtake the perjured." It is true that it has been so considered, but so also, till Müller observed and corrected the error, was the sacrifice offered by the homicide considered to represent the *slain* instead of the *slayer*. Müller, in fact, has here been untrue to his own theory, under which the victims slain at making or ratifying treaties or covenants would properly represent the parties making them, who would suffer a symbolical death in their representative victims, and so retain no power of altering the engagements thus solemnly made any more than if they had been naturally dead.

[1] See also Demosthenes, "Contra Aristocratem," pp. 643, 644, where the duty of an involuntary homicide, upon his return after a temporary exile, to *offer sacrifice* as well as to be purified is insisted on.

The guilty person among the Israelites, when a sin or trespass offering was sacrificed, or the homicide in Greece, when allowed to go through the solemn sacrificial rites of purification, did not die a symbolical death in his representative victim in all respects, but merely with respect to the particular sin or trespass or homicide in question; and with regard to that only was he considered a new man. So upon the same principle of *representation*, rather than *substitution*, in sacrifices ratifying covenants or treaties, the contracting party or parties must have been considered as dying in the sacrificed victim or victims in respect of that treaty or covenant only, and thus retaining no power of altering their minds with respect to it. Thus God binds Himself to Abraham through a sacrifice in Gen. xv. 7-18, and, by passing symbolically between the pieces of the victims, declares Himself to have suffered a symbolical death in them in respect of His covenant and promise, which is thus guaranteed by an "immutable thing, in which it was impossible that God should lie," although the further security of another "immutable thing," an oath, is afterwards given in Gen. xxii. 16.[1]

It is quite true that many writers on sacrifice have unhesitatingly and, I venture to say, heedlessly, accepted the view of those ancient authorities who considered the deaths of the victims in the case of covenants and treaties made with sacrifice to be rather symbolical of the fate that should overtake the guilty violator of the covenant, than of a death figuratively suffered by the parties at the time. Thus the death of the victims is made to denote nothing actual, but something contingent, upon certain conditions, and removed to the "dim and distant future." In proof of this erroneous view a passage is quoted from Livy (i. 24; *cf.* ix. 5), in which the *fecialis* prays that, if the Roman people is the first to violate the engagement made with the Albans, Jupiter will strike it, as he himself strikes the swine, which is the ratifying victim of the covenant. In Livy (xxi. 45), Hannibal is represented as going through a similar ceremony with a lamb, for the satisfaction of his Gallic auxiliaries.

It is singular that a somewhat similar curse is attached in the much more ancient writer, Homer, *to the pouring out of the wine* as a libation, and not to the actual death of the victim:

> Ζεῦ κύδιστε, μέγιστε, καὶ ἀθάνατοι θεοὶ ἄλλοι,
> ὁππότεροι πρότεροι ὑπὲρ ὅρκια πημήνειαν,
> ὧδέ σφ' ἐγκέφαλος χαμάδις ῥέοι ὡς ὅδε οἶνος,
> αὐτῶν καὶ τεκέων, ἄλοχοι δ' ἄλλοισι δαμεῖεν.
>
> "Iliad," iii. 298-301.

[1] "Two immutable things." CHURCHMAN, March, 1890.

All-glorious Jove, and ye the pow'rs of Heaven!
Whoso shall violate this contract first,
So be their brains, their children's, and their own,
Pour'd out, as this libation, on the ground,
And may their wives bring forth to other men!
(Corrected from Cowper.)

Neither is the imprecation uttered by anyone officially employed, but by the spectators:

ὡδε δέ τις εἴπεσκεν Ἀχαιῶν τε Τρώων τε.

Hence, I should infer that the imprecation was not *a priori* connected with the primary idea of sacrifice as applied to a covenant or treaty, but was an *a posteriori* and variable application of some one or other of its ceremonies in particular cases.

To turn to Holy Scripture.

In the important passage, Jer. xxxiv. 18-20, there is no allusion to any imprecation at all: "And I will give the men that have transgressed My covenant, which have not performed the words of the covenant, which they made before Me when they cut the calf in twain, and passed between the parts thereof, the princes of Judah, and the princes of Jerusalem, the eunuchs, and the priests, and all the people of the land, which passed between the parts of the calf; I will even give them into the hands of their enemies, and into the hands of them that seek their life: and their dead bodies shall be meat unto the fowls of the heaven, and to the beasts of the earth."

No more solemn method of reinaugurating a covenant with God could be imagined than for the authorities of a whole nation thus to suffer a symbolical death to their old sinful state, and enter upon a new life, by passing between the pieces of a representative victim cut in halves. The ceremony appears to have been copied from the sacrifice in Gen. xv., in which God, not man, is the Covenanter, and to which the imprecations above referred to are clearly inapplicable.

I think that the entire absence of an imprecation in the great and important federal sacrifices recorded in the Bible, negatively, and the disconnection of the imprecation from the death of the sacrificed victim in the passage of Homer just quoted, positively, go far to upset the popular error into which C. O. Müller fell, after triumphantly exploding another popular error, equally detrimental to the true understanding of the proper primary idea of sacrifice.

These considerations all tend to corroborate the view independently taken and maintained by Professor, now Bishop, Westcott and myself (CHURCHMAN, vol. iv., N.S., p. 594) with

regard to the difficult and much-contested passage in the Epistle to the Hebrews, in which it is plainly stated that a death on the part of the covenanting party is essential to the validity of a covenant made with sacrifice.

A. H. WRATISLAW.

ART. V.—THEOLOGICAL TERMS: THEIR USE AND ABUSE.

THE heading of this paper is a somewhat indefinite one, and needs a little explanation. It is not our purpose to attempt any close examination of the terms proper to the science of theology—for, with the late Dean of Chichester, we have no hesitation in calling theology a science. The shortest of excursions will be made in this direction. We desire to raise this question: Is theological language the best vehicle of religious truth?

First of all, what do we mean by theology as distinct from religion, viewed theoretically? We feel there is a distinction, though we might find it a little difficult to define this distinction. To the mind of the Apostles this distinction could have no place. For they were engaged in creating a theology,[1] and

[1] Readers will not confound "the creation of a theology" with the creation of a *religion*. This latter, it need hardly be said, was within the province, as it was within the power, of no Apostle. The distinction drawn by Canon Liddon in his Bampton Lectures between the terms "religion" and "theology" is well known; nevertheless a reminder will be forgiven. "It has been maintained of late that the teaching of Jesus Christ differs from that of His Apostles and of their successors, in that He only taught religion, while they have taught dogmatic theology. This statement appears to proceed upon a presumption that religion and theology can be separated, not merely in idea and for the moment, by some process of definition, but permanently and in the world of fact. What, then, is religion? If you say that religion is essentially thought whereby man unites himself to the Eternal and Unchangeable Being, it is at least plain that the object-matter of such a religious activity as this is exactly identical with the object-matter of theology. Nay, more, it would seem to follow, that a religious life is simply a life of theological speculation. If you make religion to consist in 'the knowledge of our practical duties considered as God's commandments,' your definition irresistibly suggests God in His capacity of universal legislator, and thus carries the earnestly and honestly religious man into the heart of theology. If you protest that religion has nothing to do with intellectual skill in projecting definitions, and that it is at bottom a feeling of tranquil dependence upon some higher power, you cannot altogether set aside the capital question which arises as to the nature of that power upon which religion thus depends. . . . Religion, to support itself, must rest consciously on its object; the intellectual apprehension of that object is an integral element of religion. In other words, religion is practically