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ARTICLE II.

CHINA'S ATTACK ON THE OPIUM PROBLEM.

BY GEORGE D. WILDER, PEKING, CHINA.

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CHINA'S marvelous success in her battle with the opium evil in recent years, together with the growth of Christian public opinion which has compelled the British Government to relinquish enormous revenue and honestly help China in her fight, have brought the opium problem to the attention of the world with a new interest. This interest is heightened by the attitude of the municipal councils of foreign concessions in China and of the money power aiding the opium merchants to thwart the great Chinese and British peoples in their efforts to stop the ruinous traffic. The difficulty which England, America, France, Russia, and other nations have found in fighting drug habits, alcoholism, etc., makes a study of China's amazingly successful fight well worth our while. In order to understand it, we need to consider how China came to have an opium problem. The reader who is familiar with the history may well turn nearly to the middle of this article, where the developments since 1906 are treated.

It has been a common impression that the Chinese have been addicted to the use of the drug from time immemorial, and that the British opium trade has but ministered to a demand that previously existed. On the contrary, a study of history shows that the Chinese, although they knew of the medicinal uses of the drug as early as the twelfth century, knew nothing of the method of smoking it for pleasure, and

relief from pain, until about 1700 A.D., when the Dutch from Java, who smoked it in their tobacco pipes, introduced it to the island of Formosa. As early as 1729 the Chinese Government recognized the dangerous nature of the habit, and when Portuguese traders endeavored to land a few cases, the Chinese shipped it back to its source and prohibited further import. At this time it was known only to the very few Chinese who came in contact with the foreign traders along the southern coast. The great mass of the nation knew nothing of it. It is to the credit of the Chinese Government that it so early saw the ruinous nature of the habit and tried to keep it out of the country. The Chinese had already succeeded in stamping out the alcohol habit, and would have succeeded undoubtedly in keeping out the opium trade had not the British East India Company found in it a promise of great profit for the produce of rich lands in India. The Company fostered the growth in India, prepared the drug to suit the Chinese taste, and sold it to traders, who promoted the use of the drug along the coast of China. As Sir Joshua Rowntree said, "British merchant ships spread the habit up and down the coast; opium store ships armed as fortresses were moored at the mouth of the Canton River." There is abundant evidence that the Chinese Government and people did not want it, and that the responsible authorities of the East India Company and of the British Government were aware of the evil nature of the trade. The reports of the East India Company show that its agents prepared the drug and, instead of exporting it to China, sold it to the traders, who shipped it to China, "so that the trade might be carried on without the Company being exposed to the disgrace of being engaged in an illicit commerce." The great Warren Hastings knew the nature of the trade; for he wrote, "Opium is a pernicious article of luxury

which ought not to be permitted except for the purpose of foreign commerce only." In 1782 the agents of the Company wrote from Canton, "The importation being strongly prohibited by the Chinese Government and a business altogether new to us, it was necessary to take measures for the disposing of the opium with the greatest caution." This "business altogether new" was smuggling, pure and simple, a crime that has always been very black to the British conscience. In 1796 the great emperor Chien Lung, after his son had been ruined by the drug, strenuously renewed the interdiction. The East India Company had lost the monopoly of Indian trade but still enjoyed the monopoly of the Chinese trade, and, with the protection of British men-of-war against "pirates," went on with the business of smuggling opium into China. One would like to know how many of the outrages of pirates reported by honest traders were but the attempts of the Chinese to stop smuggling. It would be interesting to compute, if possible, how great a legitimate trade has been prevented simply by the Chinese desire to prevent the smuggling of the terrible opium. How much of the hostility of the Chinese to foreign trade in general has been due to the opium traffic, and to what an extent legitimate trade might have grown had the opium traffic been nipped in the bud, will never be known. The British Government evidently was not so far-sighted as the Chinese in regard to the real interests of trade. If it could only have coöperated then with the Chinese Government as it is doing now, incomputable economic waste would have been saved and a nation-wide misery have been prevented. That the hostility of the Chinese to the opium trade was extended to all foreign trade seems absolutely certain. When British envoys expostulated with Chinese officials for trying to prevent legitimate commerce, they replied: "The same

ships which deal in tea and silk smuggle opium into our country. How then are we to distinguish between good trade and bad?" First Lord Napier, then Captain Elliott, came with British men-of-war to protect British trade. Captain Elliott suddenly found himself in the delicate position of having to protect British smugglers with British men-of-war, and he wrote: "No man entertains a deeper detestation of the shame and sin of this enforced traffic. I see little to choose between it and piracy." In 1839 he wrote, "The Chinese Government have a just ground for harsh measures towards the lawful trade, upon the plea that there is no distinction between the right and the wrong." Had Warren Hastings developed the cotton trade instead of opium, how different might have been the history of intercourse between China, with her so-called "exclusiveness," and the outside nations. Commerce, instead of missions, might have had the credit of opening China, for history will have to recognize that missions have accomplished this task with trade as a hindrance rather than a help. /

But to return to the story of the growth of the trade; in the year 1780, 1,600 chests sold at a bargain to a Chinese merchant had to be reshipped for lack of a market, there being no demand even at bargain prices. From that time on for fifty-eight years the trade was "promoted," until 20,000 chests had accumulated in the one port of Canton. It was the policy of the traders to keep the market overstocked, with a view to constant increase of the trade. Under Captain Elliott's *régime* there were constantly increasing armed conflicts between Chinese revenue cutters and British merchantmen and men-of-war, until, in 1838, Commissioner Lin was given full powers by his government to stop the traffic at all costs. The opium was contraband, and he demanded that the foreign

agents deliver it up. They were not disposed to give up \$6,000,000 worth of opium, and refused. To Commissioner Lin this seemed an enormous amount of poison to pour into the veins of his countrymen. Twenty thousand chests hold 2,800,000 pounds. Four grains is a fatal dose to one who has no opium habit, and twelve fatal doses for every man, woman, and child in China seemed too much poison to take into the country, even if India did "need the money." Commissioner Lin had full powers even to make war, but he was a reasonable man as well as a man of action, so he wrote a letter to the most Christian queen, Victoria, appealing to her sense of right and humanity. "Though not making use of it one's self," he wrote, "to venture on the manufacture and sale of opium, and with it to seduce the simple folk of this land, is to seek one's own livelihood by the exposure of others to death. Such acts are bitterly abhorrent to the nature of man, and are utterly opposed to the ways of heaven. We would now, then, concert with your Honorable Sovereignty means to bring to a perpetual end this opium traffic so harmful to mankind, we in this land forbidding the use of it, and you in the nations under your dominion forbidding its manufacture." This seems reasonable to-day, and one would like to know how on high moral grounds the Christian Queen could refuse the request. Certainly it was one more opportunity for the British Government to win the friendship of China and advance legitimate trade, but it is doubtful if Victoria ever saw the letter. With characteristic Chinese patience Commissioner Lin waited one year for a reply. Then he proceeded to action with a thoroughness that leaves nothing to be desired of a faithful agent, carrying out definite orders. He surrounded the residences of the traders, including Captain Elliott's, with his army of howling, drum-beating soldiers, and gave them one

more opportunity to deliver up the 20,000 chests of opium peaceably. This they did almost precipitately, and withdrew to the protection of the guns of the fleet at the mouth of the river. Lin mixed the opium with lime and threw it into the sea.

This action by the Chinese Government seems to-day to have been purely a matter of enforcing its legitimate customs regulations against smugglers, yet Great Britain made it a cause of war. No matter how partial historians have tried to assign other reasons for the war, we must conclude, with Sir George Staunton, speaking as a British official in the East at the close of the war in 1843, "Had there been no opium smuggling, there would have been no war." The British men-of-war seized port after port; and, sailing up the Yang Tzu to Nanking, they cut off the supply of rice to the capital through the Grand Canal. This soon brought the central Government to terms, and the treaty of Nanking, negotiated in 1843 by Sir Henry Pottinger, was quite as thoroughgoing as the acts of Commissioner Lin. 1. There was to be "lasting peace" between the two nations, which, being interpreted by the canny Chinese, would mean that China had no longer a right to enforce her regulations against the entry of opium into her ports. 2. Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo, and Shanghai were to be open, or "treaty," ports. 3. Great Britain was to have the island of Hongkong. 4. Indemnity of \$21,000,000 was to be paid for the opium and other property destroyed and for the expenses of the war. 5. British ships were to hold the ports occupied until these and other humiliating terms were complied with by the Chinese Government.

Nothing was said about opium, and the thoroughgoing British trader to-day will maintain that the war had nothing

to do with opium, but rather was due to the refusal of the Chinese to treat English representatives on terms of equality and to the stoppage of trade. This view, of course, implies that a sovereign nation had no right to control its own commerce, and disregards the fact that the commodity in question was admitted to be a vicious and contraband article fit "for purposes of foreign commerce only." It continued contraband in Chinese law and also the chief article in British trade, while China's hostility to it was greater than ever. Under these circumstances "lasting peace" was of course impossible, and in 1858 another war resulted in another treaty, that of Tientsin, by which Britain secured \$3,000,000 more, five treaty ports, toleration for the Christian religion, and at last, for the first time, the admission of opium under a specified tariff. The trade was now legalized and the traders could claim a treaty right to foist it on an unwilling people.

Thus we see that it required decades of seducing the Chinese common people, two wars, thousands of lives, \$24,000,000 in money, the loss of some of her finest seaports, and the sacrifice of her independence as a nation, in order to fix on China a ruinous, race-poisoning, soul-destroying habit. The efforts of a weak government were easily thwarted by the guns and bayonets of a great nation and devices of the trader. "But," one may ask, "if they did not want it, how did the people come to acquire the habit? After all, was there not a Chinese demand for it; so that, in the last analysis, did not the Chinese people bring the ruin upon themselves?" Mr. Merwin, in his admirable book "Drugging a Nation," has suggested an answer which every observer of Chinese misery will ratify. He says: "And I have wondered and puzzled until a smell like the smell of China has come floating into the nostrils of memory; until a picture of disease and

want and misery — of crawling, swarming human misery unlike anything that the untravelled Western mind can conceive — has appeared before the eyes of memory. I have thought of those starving thousands from the famine districts creeping into Chinkiang to die, of those gaunt, seamed faces along the highroad that runs southwestward from Peking to Sian-fu; I have thought of a land that knows no dentistry, no surgery, no hygiene, no scientific medicine, no sanitation; of a land where the smallpox is a lesser menace beside the leprosy, plague, tuberculosis, (cholera) that rage simply at will, and besides, famines so colossal in their sweep, that the overtaxed Western mind simply refuses to comprehend them. And De Quincey's words have come to me: 'What was it that drove me to opium? Misery — blank desolation — settled and abiding darkness.' These words help to clear it up. China was a wonderful field, ready prepared for the ravages of opium — none better. The mighty currents of trade did the rest. The balance sheet reigned supreme as by right. The balance sheet reigns today." Any one who has been tempted by excruciating pain to take an easy relief in an opiate will slightly understand how misery on a colossal scale might succumb to the seductions of opium in the hands of the persistent trade promoter, before the ruin it involves was understood. As the Chinese say, they "could see only the bait and not the hook." It is to their credit that they perceived the hook so soon.

The Chinese Government had learned the costly lesson that it was too weak to protect itself from the attack of a world power promoting a profitable trade, and that a Christian nation was determined to inflict the opium trade upon it. In her battle with opium, China now changed her tactics, and proceeded to take a momentous step, the wisdom of which is

quite debatable. She had had to pay \$24,000,000 in indemnity, and still had to see a constant outflow of silver to India to pay for the pernicious article which she did not want. The Government decided that if it must take the opium it would at least try to save a part of the silver by allowing its own people to produce opium for their home market. Sir Robert Hart, Inspector General of Customs, a royal official of China in spite of his British citizenship, stated China's further purpose in taking this step as follows, "Your legalized opium has been a curse in every province it has entered and your refusal to limit or decrease the import has forced us to attempt a dangerous remedy, legalized native opium, not because we approve of it but to compete with and drive out the foreign drug. And when we have only the native production to deal with, and thus have the business in our own hands, we hope to stop the traffic in our own way." China hoped to do by peaceful trade competition what she was unable to do by force of arms. But she failed to drive out the Indian article. Chinese taste demanded it and the powerfully entrenched opium monopoly held its ground; China never was able to satisfy the home market. So it was she came to have an opium problem, terribly complicated by a foreign money power in the form of a government monopoly under the strongest nation on earth, exploiting a drug habit which is the most inveterate known.

It seems a work of supererogation to try to prove the evils of the opium habit, and yet there are still persons who declare, with the Royal Commission, that "it is a pleasant and harmless stimulant," a reliever of pain, and no family should be without it,—in China. Such persons, like the Royal Commission, are open to the suspicion that they are not disinterested judges. It may be worth while to remind our-

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selves that opium is an extremely costly vice. A coolie who can earn fifteen or twenty cents gold a day, will have to spend from five to eight cents per smoke. His appetite will rapidly demand three, five, ten smokes a day. It speedily demands his whole income, leaving nothing for food and clothes, until he dies, tortured between the extremes alternately of hunger and craving for opium. It takes not only money but time from the business of life. A rich man will take a half hour for a smoke, and his appetite often grows to demand fifteen or twenty smokes a day, or seven to ten hours at the pipe, not counting the time taken to sleep it off. Where comes in any time for business? A fine business and great fortune soon comes to nought with an opium-taking master. Any one who has been through the province of Shansi with open eyes has seen a rich and teeming people whose numbers have been diminished one half in ten years by opium and famine. The famines are largely caused by the opium, for the poppy plant occupied all the irrigated land; so that when drought came, and the grain lands failed to produce, there was no food, and the mountain barriers prevented bringing it in. He has seen villages of 2,000 families reduced to 200, or absolutely depopulated. He has seen the palatial residences of the Shansi bankers stripped of furniture, timbers, and roofs, with the once wealthy owner living in a cave and begging a few cash to relieve the craving that has made him sell all, including wife and children. He will have seen abundant evidence of the truth reiterated by the best of authorities on all sides, that opium ruins a man's body, mind, morals, family, property, the very soil and the nation. As Dr. Christie, a physician of long experience, says, "The evils arising from the abuse of opium can hardly be overstated. It is sucking out the life and energy of this great nation." This is but one testimony.

out of over a hundred similar ones from doctors resident in China who speak the language and give 750,000 treatments per year, so that they know of what they speak.

The Chinese in Canton say there are ten "can'ts" connected with the opium habit. "The opium fiend can't give up the habit; can't enjoy sleep; can't wait for his turn when smoking with a friend; can't rise early; can't be cured when sick; can't help relatives in need; can't enjoy wealth; can't plan anything; can't get credit even if he is an old customer; and can't walk any distance." The introduction to a pamphlet giving the testimonies of the foreign physicians in China, mentioned above, was written by the general manager of the Soochow city salt gabelle in 1906, and quaintly expresses the common Chinese view of the opium habit. "Opium was originally intended as a medicinal remedy, but in China this use has been changed, so that persons once beginning, continue the use of it; and thus is developed a craving for the drug, to such an extent that it becomes as necessary as food. It is now freely used throughout the empire and its victims are numbered by myriads. The slaves of the habit have their faces shrunken and dark. They become old, infirm and incapacitated before their time and all finances are exhausted. This condition is pitiable but it is not the worst, for those who hold office become greedy and grasping, those who are soldiers lose their nerve, the number of the depraved population is increased daily and the wealth of the country steadily decreases. Sadder than all is the fact that for the most trivial of causes, such as family quarrels, since opium is so easily secured, suicides by its use are of most common occurrence, numbering tens of thousands annually. Thus we may calculate that from the time opium was first introduced into China until now, over one hundred years, the numbers of deaths

must count into the millions. Not only I, but all good men bemoan such a state of affairs. The American missionaries Dr. Dubose and Dr. Park being influenced by divine truth are seeking to propagate the doctrine of salvation through Christ to all men, and their arguments concerning the evils of opium, are in exact accord with the mind of the writer." The evidence of those in close touch with the users of opium is simply overwhelmingly against the statements of the Royal Commission and others more or less interested in the trade. It abundantly shows why the Chinese as a nation do not want the traffic, and also why its suppression has become a vital problem for China.

In 1906 it had become evident that China could never get control of the traffic by trade competition any more than by war. Public opinion in England had become strongly against continuing a traffic which Parliament in 1891 had declared to be "morally indefensible." China was encouraged to throw herself on the goodwill of Britain, and a new plan of campaign was adopted. The Chinese Government announced the plan to its people in these words, by edict in 1906. "The cultivation of the poppy is the greatest iniquity in agriculture and the provinces of Szechuen, Shensi, Kansu, Yunnan, Kweichow, Shansi and Anhui abound in its product, which in fact is found everywhere. Now that it is decided to abandon opium smoking within ten years, the limiting of this cultivation should be taken as a fundamental step. Opium has been used so long by the people that nearly three tenths or four tenths are smokers," i.e. 150,000,000 people, or one and a half times as many as the total population of the United States.

Such was the announcement of a new attack on opium. Before we study the measures employed, let us note the exceeding difficulty and complexity of the problem.

1. Note the numbers involved in the habit. The estimate of the Government of three or four tenths of the people is, of course, only the rough guess of some official who drafted the edict, as China has no authoritative census. A foreign life insurance agent in China reported that fifty per cent of the applicants for insurance are smokers. These of course are wealthy men, among whom the percentage is higher than among the total population. Alexander Hosie, who has been for many years the Commissioner of the British Government to report on the conditions of the trade in cultivation in the provinces, says: "In the cities of Szechuen 50 per cent of the males and 20 per cent of the females smoke, while in the country 25 per cent of males and 5 per cent of females." A British consul thirty years ago estimated as follows, "Of labourers and farmers 10 per cent, of small shopkeepers 30 per cent, of large merchants 80 per cent, officials and their staff 90 per cent, actors, thieves, prostitutes and vagrants 95 per cent, use opium." A Chinese native of Shansi estimates that 90 per cent of the people smoke, and a foreigner, also born there, says 70 per cent. Four viceroys who jointly petitioned the throne to abolish opium said, "China can never become strong and stand shoulder to shoulder with other nations unless she can get rid of this habit of opium smoking by her subjects, about one quarter of whom have been reduced to skeletons and look half dead."

2. The inveteracy of the habit is so well known that it will be recognized as a factor that renders extremely difficult the abolition of the drug. A habit which drives a man to starvation, to selling his own wife and children and the roof over his head, would seem almost unbreakable by anything but the grace of God.

3. Such nation-wide debauchery in so inveterate a habit is

to be put down by an official class, 90 per cent of whom are estimated to be more or less confirmed smokers or otherwise interested in the trade. The private squeeze from the trade, especially when it becomes illicit, is of course one of the most elastic sources of income for the unscrupulous official, and he is under the strongest temptation to become a partner in the traffic.

4. To stop using opium means the rearrangement of the agricultural plan of several of the provinces, where the most fertile irrigated plains are given up to the growth of the poppy, and it is said the strength of the soil has been greatly impaired for the growth of cereals.

5. It also means a revolution in the transportation and marketing problem, for this immensely valuable product is now easily and cheaply carried to a distant market, as a mule can carry a load worth \$10,000 and a man one worth many hundreds of dollars.

6. A more acute difficulty for the Government is that, in taking a stand for the abolition of the trade, it cuts off one fifth or one sixth of its total customs revenue, some \$6,000,000. The great argument that carried in the British Parliament for many decades against stopping the shameful traffic was, "India needs the revenue"; but we do not hear that China puts any such argument to the front against stopping the traffic now, though there is no source proposed as yet, to supply the revenue that will be lost when opium is imported no more.

7. All difficulties mentioned up to this point China faces bravely, confident that she can overcome them; and, indeed, she has shown the world that she has abundant ground for the confidence, for she has overcome them already in fifteen provinces out of twenty-two. But the last obstacle I would

mention is one that gives us pause. It is the one that has thwarted every effort of the Chinese Government in the past, and only the power of Christian sentiment in Britain to-day, gives any hope that it will not once more thwart the mightiest effort ever made by any nation to rid itself of a drug curse. I mean the fact that the Opium Monopoly (and this is its official title, not an ill-considered slander on the traffic) is a long-established Government business.

Nearly sixty years ago the Earl of Shaftesbury (then Lord Ashley) obtained from the officers of the crown the admission that the opium trade was "at variance with the spirit and intention" of the treaty with China. In 1891 the majority of the House of Commons declared "the system by which the Indian opium revenue is raised is morally indefensible." In 1893 Mr. Gladstone lent his powers to passing a pseudo-anti-opium measure. It included sending a royal commission to India. Among other features really calculated to defeat the anti-opium movement, while seeming to favor it, was the suggestion to the Indian Government to "continue their policy of greatly diminishing the cultivation of the poppy." This looks as though a policy of diminishing the trade had already been settled by the Government. Whereas, a study of the report made by this same Commission, which was emphatically pro-opium, shows that, on their arrival in India, there was no trace of any such policy ever having been proposed, much less adopted. The head of the Indian finance department said to the Commission: "I was not aware that that was the policy of the Home Government. The policy has been for some time to sell about the same amount every year." It certainly comes as a shock to be told that the British Government, after recognizing that the trade is contrary to treaty, morally indefensible, and after repeatedly deploring the traf-

fic, has continued consistently to increase the trade, which is its own monopoly, and that since 1891 it has actually manufactured candies mixed with opium and spices for the children of India, as a means of extending the sale. We who are interested in Anglo-Saxon honor certainly wish to have definite proof before we can believe that such things are so, and if true, to see to it that the money power in the trade is not allowed longer to defeat the will of the British public, by deception and misinformation. Accordingly I submit extracts made by Mr. Merwin, in "Drugging a Nation," from the Blue Book issued by the House of Commons, May 10, 1907, on the "Moral and Material Progress of India during the year 1905-06." "The opium revenue is partly raised by a monopoly of the production of the drug in Bengal and in the United Provinces, and partly by the levy of a duty on all opium imported from native states. . . . In these two provinces the crop is grown under the control of a government department, which arranges the total area which is to be placed under the crop with a view to the amount of opium required. . . . The cultivator of opium in these monopoly districts receives a license, and is granted advances [of money without interest] to enable him to prepare the land for the crop, and he is required to deliver the whole of the product at a fixed price to the opium agents, by whom it is despatched to the government factories at Patna and Ghazipur."

The report goes on to show that less than 9,000 chests (140 lbs. each) are used in India; while 51,770 chests of the "provision opium," expressly prepared for the Chinese trade, were sold during the year, at auction, to the traders. The Government had 654,000 acres under cultivation, and a net revenue of \$22,000,000. Rudyard Kipling has given us vivid description of the rigid exactness with which the Government

officials secure every ounce of opium for the revenues of the Indian Government. Not content with this, the Colonial Governments of Singapore and Hongkong levy further tribute on the trade. The opium has to be boiled up to a better consistency before being retailed, and these two dependencies have made this boiling a monopoly of the crown. Their revenues are further largely increased by selling the exclusive rights to farm the opium trade to the highest bidder, either an individual or a corporation.

The report quoted above is abundant evidence that, up to its date, the British Government had the production and the trade entirely in its control at every point from the Indian field to the retail opium den in China. The rigorous attention which it devoted to gaining every dollar possible from the trade at every point, and the way the talent of England's greatest statesmen was prostituted to the task of protecting the trade and soothing the aroused public opinion, gives us a slight measure of the enormous difficulty which faced the Chinese Government in 1906, when it began the work of eliminating the traffic. At the present time the British Government has confessed its wrong, it has renounced the Indian opium revenue, providing from other sources for the income now derived from opium as soon as it shall cease. But there is still the insidious agency of the money power represented by the opium traders, the other banking interests connected with them, and the Municipal Councils of the great treaty ports, which still threaten to defeat all efforts to stop the legalized trade.

Recall these difficulties reviewed above, and try to imagine a moral campaign against the drug. It is like reforming all Europe of the liquor habit, a seeming impossibility; and the opium traders have gambled with enormous stakes upon this

impossibility. Let us see how China has attacked the problem, and with what success.

The working scheme of the Government for stopping the consumption of opium within ten years, in condensed outline, is as follows, as gathered from the regulations that were put into effect by the edict of November, 1906.

1. Governors of provinces were to list all opium lands, and the area of the cultivation was to be cut down one ninth each year until the plant was exterminated, and the land never to be used again for this purpose. Should owners disobey, their lands were to be confiscated. Rewards were offered to officials who might stop all cultivation before the set time.

2. All smokers were to be registered with name, age, address, and amount smoked each day, and to receive a certificate.

3. All private opium dens to be closed, and government shops opened which were to sell only to bearers of certificates. No new shops were to be opened.

4. No new smokers were allowed to register after the date of prohibition.

5. Those over sixty years of age were to be allowed to go on smoking until death, but those under sixty might have only three years' time in which to cease entirely. One third less opium would be sold to them each year, so that at the end of three years no more opium would be sold to them.

6. Opium hospitals and refuges for those trying to break off the habit were to be opened, and new methods of treatment were to be sought.

7. All officials, civil or military or naval, and professors in universities and colleges must be cured within six months or be dismissed.

8. The customs authorities were ordered strictly to pro-

hibit the import of morphia for any but medical purposes, as the habit of injecting morphia is "worse than opium."

9. The Foreign Office was instructed to negotiate with governments of nations sending opium to China with a view to stopping the trade within the term of ten years set for the stopping of opium smoking.

The success with which these regulations were enforced amazed the world. A few words will suffice to recall the steps. In accordance with the last mentioned item, the negotiation with other governments regarding the prohibition of the import of opium into China was entered into at once, and within a year the Indian Government began to decrease its import by one tenth per annum, with a view to stopping in ten years, but promised to do so for a period of three years only, pending the success of the Chinese in performing their part of the task. In case the Chinese were successful, the decrease would be continued until the traffic was eliminated. Friends of the traffic could not believe that China was sincere in her efforts really to dissipate the habit. In 1908, after less than two years, the report of investigators as to the degree of success which had attended the efforts of China to stop the trade and consumption within her borders was as follows: "The prohibition of opium smoking is the greatest reform the world has ever seen. Five hundred thousand dens in cities and towns were closed in the first six months without resistance. Consumption in cities has fallen off 30 per cent, that in towns 50 per cent, and in rural districts it has been reduced to a minimum." During the three years of tentative suppression, the edicts urging on the reform appeared repeatedly, the regulations were made more and more stringent for reducing the cultivation of the poppy, prohibiting the manufacture of the paraphernalia for smoking, assisting

victims to break off the habit, and closing the shops. The International Reform Bureau kept up constant agitation, the Chinese and British Anti-Opium societies were active, the International Opium Commission, which met in Shanghai, February, 1909, recommended further measures to the governments represented, the Chinese National Assembly took a strong stand against the traffic, the Missionary Conference at Edinburgh took emphatic action on the subject, and a day of humiliation and prayer was decreed for October 24, 1910, the fiftieth anniversary of the ratification of the treaty of Tientsin by which the opium traffic was first legalized. Chinese students by tens of thousands sent petitions to the British Government to grant a more speedy termination of the trade. The Indian Government was willing to go on with the plan to suppress totally by 1917, but the Chinese were ready to terminate it earlier. The British Government sent Sir Alexander Hosie to investigate the interior provinces. He found Shansi and Szechuan free from the cultivation of opium, and other provinces had reduced the area under cultivation from 25 per cent in Kansu to 75 per cent in Yunnan. In May, 1911, the renewed agreement with Britain for the remaining seven years was to this effect: "His Majesty's Government, recognizing the sincerity of the Chinese Government and their pronounced success in diminishing the production of opium in China during the past three years," are prepared to continue the arrangement to stop the traffic in 1917, and further "agree that the export of opium from India to China shall cease in less than seven years, if clear proof is given of the complete absence of production of native opium in China." It was arranged that the cessation of the traffic should be province by province. Whenever a province in China was declared free of the poppy by a British Commis-

sioner on the ground, then the import into that province would cease. As the British have commissioners to watch the poppy cultivation in China, the Chinese were allowed a commissioner to watch the export from India; and to assist the regulation of the trade, the opium chests exported were to be numbered in series. Provision was made for the modification of the arrangement by mutual consent at any time within the seven years. This admirably fair agreement redounds to the everlasting credit of the British Government, and it is needless to say that it has been carrying out the provisions of the agreement with scrupulous care. The Hongkong Government has followed the lead of His Majesty's Government, and has provided for the supply of the revenue lost on opium, by taxing liquors. The Municipal Councils of the great ports of Shanghai and Tientsin have not, however, followed the spirit of the British Government in assisting China to carry out the elimination of the traffic, as we shall see, and the greatest danger to the reform lies here. In 1914 the Chinese Government had proceeded so far that it was ready to modify the agreement, and to hasten the absolute prohibition of the traffic, ending it January, 1915, instead of January, 1917. A special embassy to Parliament did its utmost to persuade the United Kingdom to coöperate with China in ending the trade within the year, but the friends of the traffic succeeded in preventing any change in the seven-year agreement. The main argument seemed to be that the trade having continued so long, it is a small matter whether it continues two years more or less.

As soon as the Chinese began seriously to restrict the retail trade in opium, the price went up by leaps and bounds. The great opium importers, not believing that the Chinese could possibly carry out the reform, invested their all in In-

dian opium. They hastened the import during the few months preceding the enforcement of the regulations regarding diminished import, until there was accumulated in the receiving hulks at treaty ports stocks of opium counting up 22,000 chests, valued in 1914 at \$4,500 per chest, or three times its cost in India in the fall of 1912. It is expected to rise to at least \$5,000 per chest before the end of the year. This promise of some 300 per cent profit led the opium merchants to borrow on the security of the stocks of opium from the banks, in order doubtless to invest in more opium. This arranges the great banking interests on the side of these merchants who have staked their tens of millions on China's inability to free herself from this curse. Accordingly the whole influence of these foreign communities on the coast of China has been to foster the trade as long as possible within their own city limits and to enable the smugglers of opium into the closed provinces to operate on as large a scale as possible.

The extreme earnestness of China in enforcing her anti-opium regulations may be seen by anyone interested in viewing the events of the past few years. Speaking in the House, in answer to sneers as to China's sincerity, Mr. Montagu, the Under-Secretary of State for India, on May 7, 1913, said: "I would like the House to accept as undisputable that . . . there cannot be the slightest doubt of the earnestness, sincerity, steadfastness and courage of the Chinese Government and the Chinese people as a whole in ridding themselves of opium. All the evidence points to that conclusion. . . . I venture to say, without fear of contradiction, that the history of the world shows few actions in its bravery and thoroughness comparable to the efforts that are now being made by the Chinese people to rid themselves of the drug that is sapping their manhood and destroying their chance of development, . . . say with all

sense of responsibility on this question, that there is no reason for cynicism or skepticism and no work for the scoffer and sneerer. China has shown to the world an example of moral courage rare in the annals of the human race." Since these noble and true words were spoken, China has multiplied the evidence for their truth, and that too in spite of a rebellion against the Republic, suppressed at the cost of much life and money in July of the same year; in spite of the obstructive tactics of a four-month parliament, hopelessly at variance with every effort of constructive statesmanship and to a large extent conspiring with the rebels; and in spite of the ravages of White Wolf bandits that laid waste parts of four provinces. The former Manchu government and the Republic alike, even in their weakest moments, when their very existence has been trembling in the balance, have continued the fight against opium. Every party, no matter what its political shade, the Manchus, the Chinese, the Northerners, the Southerners, the monarchists, the republicans, the patriots, and the professional revolutionists, supporters and enemies of Yüan Shih-kai,—all alike are anti-opium, and there is no pro-opium party in the land.

The great features of the fight have been such as these. Farmers who had valuable opium crops banded together with the banditti to resist the authorities of the Province of Fukien, and for some months the imperial troops were required, in order to compel obedience, and succeeded only after some thousands of the opium rebels were killed. Here and there, as public examples throughout the country, simple farmers had to be executed before the inexorable stand of the Government was understood. And yet the people generally helped on the campaign. In the City of Shanghai, where 500,000 Chinese are living under foreign jurisdiction, in spite

of the fact that the foreign rulers refused to stop issuing the licenses to opium shops, they voluntarily sacrificed many tens of thousands of dollars' worth of the paraphernalia of opium shops and private homes to the flames in public burning. In Kalgan at the North, on January 23, 1914, 6,000 ounces of opium worth two dollars an ounce, with pipes and gambling apparatus, were burned in public after a speech by the local military commander explaining the Government's attitude. The value destroyed was some \$18,000. In March, at Chinkiang, 3,000 ounces, and in Tientsin \$48,000 worth of opium were destroyed. In April, at Nanking, opium to the value of \$15,000, and in distant Turkestan 5,000 ounces, were in like manner disposed of. On May 14th, at the Central Railway station, several thousand ounces that had been captured from smugglers on the railway were burned. A week later, at the entrance to the beautiful Temple of Heaven, we saw another similar burning under most impressive circumstances. It included a saddle in which the wooden framework had been hollowed out and filled with opium. The customs police at the city gate had detected the would-be equestrian smuggler, and added his stock of opium to the pile. In the capital of Kueichow province six loads of opium were burnt in the public examination hall. At Tungchou two army officers who had engaged in the trade were publicly shot to clear the army of the stain of complicity in the traffic. At Ichang, on the Yangtze River, two men were found planting poppy and were shot. In Anping, Kueichow province, last May a farmer was shot for persisting in cultivating the poppy. All these are but a few examples from many that are spread through the pages of the recent history of China. At the beginning of the present year fifteen of the twenty-two provinces, after searching examination by British officials, have been declared

free from the poppy plant, and the legalized trade in these provinces has ceased. Missionaries who have been familiar for decades with the location of opium dens in the large cities like Foochow, Peking, etc., for the last three or four years have been unable even to find a den to show to the curious tourist friend. We rarely see a man addicted to the habit where formerly, such men formed a large part of one's acquaintance. In thus sacrificing the lives, and the money, of its people for a greater good, the Chinese Government is also losing tens of millions in revenue when it might take control of the trade and make enormous profits, at a time when it is almost bankrupt and depending on borrowed money for current expenses. Nothing could be more absolute demonstration of the determination of the Chinese to root out the evil, nothing could be better proof of their sincerity and ability to stamp it out, if permitted to do so by the foreigner.

This inadequate survey of a matchless fight against an enormous evil cannot be concluded without calling attention to the striking contrast to the Chinese moral earnestness which is presented by the attitude of the municipalities like Shanghai. Shanghai, it should be noted, is an international municipality in which the British have a controlling influence, but over which the British Government has no direct control, and can only advise. The British Minister has repeatedly requested and advised that the foreign concessions of the treaty ports should take the lead of the Chinese in suppressing the opium trade within their borders, and should not wait until the local Chinese magistrates over adjacent territory ask them to stop the trade. In July, 1914, it was reported in the House of Commons that "special concessions in Tientsin, Amoy, Foochow, Hankow and elsewhere as well as the settlement of Shanghai, are being used as special markets for the wholesale

disposal of Indian opium to Chinese dealers against the will of the government and the interests of their people. To the shame of the British good name these places and especially Shanghai itself, are converted into wide open shops for the retail sale of Indian opium to the Chinese who cannot buy it over the border in their own territory. The consequence is that those Chinese sots who cannot get opium in Chinese territory have been swarming into Shanghai and have raised the prices of lodging houses and hotels."

Rev. Arnold Foster, a British missionary of Hankow, has recently exposed the shame of Shanghai in an unanswerable statement, derived entirely from the official records of the proceedings of the Municipal Council. These records abound in expressions of the successive chairmen of the Council that the settlement of foreigners has "sincere sympathy" for the Chinese efforts to suppress opium, and that there "is every intention on the part of this community to assist them." "But," says one chairman, "we are not unfamiliar with Chinese official procedure, and how far short actual administrative results fall when compared with the official pronouncements that precede them. It is quite impossible not to be sceptical as to the intentions of the Chinese government in this matter." At the time this sympathy was expressed the number of opium shops licensed in Shanghai Municipality was eighty-seven. In May, 1914, six years later, there were 663 such shops. When this promise of help was given in 1908, there was a revenue of taels 5,450 per month; in May, 1914, it had grown to 10,995 per month, from the licenses. Both the number of shops and the revenue from them and crime statistics have grown steadily during the period. This inconsistency between "official pronouncements" and "actual administrative results" on the part of the Shanghai Muni-

pal Council is the more glaring when we find that the Shanghai native city adjoining, under "the Chinese official procedure" at which the chairman had sneered, had absolutely closed all opium shops and kept them closed up to date, and had politely requested the foreign settlement to cooperate. In the country at large the diminution of the trade is seen in the fact that the Chinese customs returns for 1914 show only one third as much revenue from opium as in 1913. As one British editor of a weekly in Shanghai remarks, it would seem that the Council in Shanghai thinks the way to help a man who has been knocked down by an automobile is to fell him with your fist as he attempts to rise. These treaty ports under the control of foreigners, where the opium sots from the territory round about congregate, and where the smugglers of opium get their supplies to introduce into the provinces closed to the legal trade, are the main points of contact with Western nations for some 200,000,000 Chinese. It is a calamity to the whole civilized world to have that number of Chinese form their views of Western nations from these examples of greedy immorality, vain boasting, and calculated insincerity. It becomes the duty of every right-minded man and lover of comity between the nations to retrieve so far as possible the evil reputation we have received already through the enforcement of the opium traffic for seventy years, and to recognize the sincere and successful efforts of the Chinese to rid themselves of this curse. It is to be hoped that the moral earnestness aroused in Great Britain by the present European war will keep alive the sense of responsibility to continue to the end her aid to China in this war on opium—a struggle just as significant for the civilization of the future as is the European war.