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plicity of the Patriarchal faith; they do not get Judaism, or the controversies of the Augustinian period; they do not get Monasticism; nor the superstitions of the Middle ages; nor the intolerance of later times. They get the spiritual and living religion which we have. They step at a stride across all the distance traversed by the race in religious growth. They emerge at once from the moral region of the flood, or beyond it, to the summit of the nineteenth century.

We close our rapid survey by remarking that it becomes the modern church to remember her true historical position. The ages have been struggling for her. The victories of the past are hers. All time has been in travail to give her birth. Her proper place and attitude is to stand on the summit of the religious achievements hitherto made, with her eye gleaming with Divine light, fixed on higher achievements in the future. Let her not turn backwards. Let her not take to her bosom any of the old and lower types of religion, nor hold to them with clutched hand. Let her live more in the future, and for the future, than the past, obeying the Divine direction which Moses was commanded to communicate to the ancient church, but which contains the spirit of God's perennial call to the church in every age: "Speak unto the children of Israel, **THAT THEY GO FORWARD.**"

ARTICLE V.

THE THEOLOGY OF DR. GILL.

By Rev. Daniel T. Fisk, Newburyport, Mass.

ONE of the most noticeable and hopeful features in the present condition of the theological world, is a revived and increasing interest in the department of ecclesiastical history. This interest has been gradually manifesting itself,

not only among the speculative minds of Germany, but also among the more practical thinking men in England and America. And what especially renders this awakened interest an omen of good, is the fact, that it has been directed, not chiefly to the external affairs of the church, but to the *doctrines* as they are found embodied in creeds and symbols, and the elaborated systems of eminent theologians. Familiarity with dogmatic history cannot fail to advance the truth, promote comprehensiveness of faith, allay the bitterness of sectarian feeling, and in many ways contribute to the unity of "the body of Christ."

That is not, then, a useless nor unimportant service which presents to the student of theology a faithful epitome of the doctrinal views of eminent divines of other days. This service the present Article proposes to render in regard to one who has been thought worthy by many to stand in the line of immediate succession to the most distinguished English theologians of the seventeenth century.

John Gill (D. D.) was born on the 23d of Nov. (O. S.) 1697, at Kettering in Northamptonshire, England. In very early life he was a subject of deep religious impressions; and, at the age of twelve years, gave evidence of true conversion; although it was several years later when he publicly professed his faith in Christ by uniting with the Baptist church; of which his parents were members and his father a deacon. To the peculiar tenets of that church, on the subject of baptism, he was strongly attached, and was a ready and zealous champion of the same. While yet young, he entered the ministry, and, in 1719, was called to the charge of a church at Horsely Down, Southwark, near London. Here he passed the remainder of his days, in "labors abundant," and died in 1771, in his seventy-fourth year. His published works are voluminous, and bear honorable testimony to his industry, ability, scholarship, and piety. Besides numerous controversial pamphlets and tracts, he edited the works of Dr. Crisp, accompanying them with notes and a memoir; published a work entitled "Cause of God and Truth," in four large octavo volumes; a Commen-

tary on the entire Scriptures, in seven folio volumes ; a Body of Doctrinal Divinity, in two quarto volumes ; and a Body of Practical Divinity, also in two quarto volumes. The substance of his principal published works, was first preached to his own people, in courses of sermons. But although his sermons were, to a great extent, "doctrinal," and his style was cumbrous and unadorned, his earnestness of manner rendered him not only an acceptable, but even a popular, preacher.¹ As a controversialist, he was fearless, uncompromising, never weary of returning to the combat, sometimes manifesting a vehement and overbearing spirit, which constrained even his admiring biographer to admit that, occasionally, he used "a little more acrimony and severity, than perhaps some might think needful;" and which led John Wesley to say of him: "he is a positive man, and fights for his opinions through thick and thin." As a scholar, his attainments were more than respectable. Besides a general knowledge of the Latin, Greek, and Hebrew languages, he was well versed in scholastic, patristic, and rabbinical lore ; and one of his partial biographers goes so far as to say: "if any one can be supposed to have trod the whole circle of human learning, it was Dr. Gill."² As a theologian, he was a good representative of that type of Calvinism widely prevalent previously to the "improvements in theology," made by President Edwards. The influence of a familiarity with the metaphysics of the schoolmen is everywhere discernible in his works ; while his unimaginitive mind led him to a bald literalism in his interpretation of the Scriptures, which could employ Oriental imagery in exact scientific statement of doctrine. No less a person than Toplady says of him: "Perhaps no man since the days of St. Austin has written so largely in defence of the system of grace, and certainly no man has treated that momentous subject, in all its branches,

¹ His biographer states that he sometimes exerted himself so much, as to require three or four handkerchiefs to wipe the perspiration from his face during a single discourse.—Memoir prefixed to his *Com. on N. T.*, p. 29.

² *Memoir*, p. 31.

more closely, judiciously, and successfully." "While true religion and sound learning have a single friend remaining in the British Empire, the works and name of Gill will be precious and revered."¹

We proceed to give a brief outline of the theological views of Dr. Gill, presenting them, to a great extent, in his own language.

I. *Systematic Theology.*

In opposition to views entertained by some, both before and since his day, Dr. Gill maintained the possibility and advantage of reducing the doctrines of religion to a scientific form. "Systematic Divinity, I am sensible, is now become very unpopular. Formulas and articles of faith, creeds, confessions, catechisms, and summaries of divine truth, are greatly decried in our age; and yet what art or science soever but has been reduced to a system, physics, metaphysics, logic, rhetoric, etc." "Philosophy in general has had its several systems." "And why should divinity, the most noble science be without a system? Evangelical truths are spread and scattered about in the sacred Scriptures: and to gather them together and dispose of them in regular orderly method, surely cannot be disagreeable, but must be useful, for the more clear and perspicuous understanding of them; for the better retaining them in memory, and to show the connection, harmony, and agreement of them."²

To those who insist that "all articles and confessions of

¹ Memoir, p. 32. While Dr. Gill has had his admirers and eulogists among great and good men, it is but just to say that others, equally great and good, have been less favorably impressed by the perusal of his works. Among this number was Robert Hall. "He did not like Dr. Gill as an author." When Mr. Christmas Evans was in Bristol he was talking to Mr. Hall about the Welch language, which he said was very copious and expressive. "How I wish, Mr. Hall, that Dr. Gill's works had been written in Welch." "I wish they had, sir, I wish they had with all my heart, for then I should never have read them. They are a continent of mud, sir."—Hall's Works, Vol. III. p. 82.

² Body of Divinity, p. 2. Our references, in this Article, when not otherwise stated, are to the edition of Dr. Gill's Body of Divinity, published London, 1769, 2 vols. 4to, bound in one volume, and to Sermons and Tracts, 3 vols. 4to, London, 1773.

faith in which men are to agree, should be expressed in the bare words of the sacred Scriptures," he replies: "Though we ought to entertain the highest esteem of the words of Scripture, and have the greatest value for them, yet our sense of them cannot be expressed but in words literally varying from them." "Moreover, to be obliged to express ourselves only in the words of Scripture, would be" (a) "to destroy all exposition and interpretation of Scripture;" (b) "to make the ministry and preaching of the word in a great measure useless;" (c) to "cramp all religious conversation about divine things;" (d) to make it "unlawful to think or conceive in the mind any other than what the Scriptures express; which, as Dr. Owen says," "is to make *brutes* of ourselves, and to frustrate the whole design of God, in giving unto us the great privilege of his word;" (e) to render it impossible to distinguish the sentiments of one person from those of another, though diametrically opposite. "So an Arian cannot be known from an Athanasian."¹

II. *The Ground of Moral Distinctions.*

Dr. Gill admits, that the difference between moral good and evil, "is certain and immutable," but denies that it arises from the nature of things, or the fitness of things," or that it is "strictly eternal" "prior to the will of God and independent of it." "The difference between moral good and evil lies in, and the fitness and unfitness of things are no other than, the agreement and disagreement of them, with the nature and will of God; and whatsoever ideas we have of these things, and of their different natures, fitnesses, and unfitnesses, we have from God, who, of his own will and pleasure, has implanted them in us."²

"As natural light and darkness are of God, and the distinction between them, is made by him, so moral light and moral darkness are; the one by his effective, and the other by his permissive, will; and the difference between them is

¹ Bod. Div. pp. 7, 8, 9.

² Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 164.

settled by the determinations of his unchangeable mind, agreeable to the perfections of his nature."¹

"It remains, then, that nothing can be a rule to God but himself, his own nature, and the perfections of it. In all things of a moral nature, his moral perfections within himself, are the rule of his will and conduct."² "Some things are just because he [God] wills them, such that are of a positive kind; and others he wills, because they are just, being agreeable to his nature and moral perfections."³ Dr. Gill does not seem clearly to discriminate between the theory that makes the ground of moral distinctions to be the *law* of God, and the theory that makes it to be the very *nature and character* of God himself. The latter, however, is that which he seems rather to adopt. A thing is right, not merely because God wills and commands it, but because in willing and commanding it, he acts agreeably to his moral perfections. Right and wrong lie not merely in "the determinations" of the Divine mind, but in the perfections of the Divine nature, to which these determinations are conformed. It is not evident that this theory has any advantage over that which simply refers the distinction between right and wrong to the arbitrary will of God. The same objection lies, with equal force, against both theories. If right or wrong depend, ultimately, on the will of God, then we have only to suppose that will changed, and the quality of all moral actions is changed also; virtue becomes vice, and vice becomes virtue. In like manner, if moral distinctions depend, ultimately, on the Divine character, then we have only to suppose that character to change, or to have been originally different from what it is, and then right becomes wrong, and wrong is transformed into right. Dr. Gill meets this objection by simply denying that a change in the Divine character is supposable.

The following is a specimen of Dr. Gill's reasoning, against the theory, that the ground of moral distinctions, is in "the nature or fitness of things." "The nature and fit-

¹ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 168. ² Ibid. p. 170. ³ Bod. Div. p. 185.

ness of things originate in the will of God, and is not something to be considered, abstracted from God; for then, it exists by necessity of nature, and is itself the Deity; for nothing exists by necessity of nature, independent of the will of God, but the being and perfections of God; either, therefore, this nature and fitness of things is something in God, or something without him; if it is something in him, it must be a perfection of his nature, it must be himself, and therefore ought not to be considered as abstracted from him; if it is something without him, and apart from him, which exists independent of his will, that is, necessarily, then there must be two necessarily-existing beings; that is, two Gods." ¹ Dr. Gill fails to notice the criticism often made on this argument, that it derives all its force from a wrong meaning put upon the somewhat indefinite phrase, "nature of things." In the discussion of this subject, it refers not to material objects, nor to created beings, but to moral actions; and those who employ it, mean to affirm, that certain actions of intelligent beings, are right or wrong, *in their very nature*, and cannot possibly be otherwise; just as, in the very nature of things, two and two make four; the whole is greater than a part; the square of the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle, is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two sides.

We find, in the works of Dr. Gill, no allusion to the Utilitarian theory of morals. The reason may be, that that theory had not been brought forward so prominently, in the discussion of this subject, in his day, as it has been since. He expended his strength in controverting another theory, which was just then enlisting in its favor, earnest and able advocates.

III. *The Bible.*

A revelation necessary. This necessity arises, not wholly from man's sinfulness, but in part from that natural imperfection, which belongs to him as a creature. "A Divine

¹ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 163.

revelation was necessary to Adam in a state of innocence; how, otherwise, should he have known anything of the manner of his creation; of the extent of his power and authority over the creation; in what manner, God was to be served and worshipped by him, especially the parts of positive and instituted worship, both as to matter, time, and place."¹ But this necessity is greatly increased by human sinfulness. "If our first parents stood in need of a Divine revelation, as a rule and guide to them, in their state of integrity, then much more we, in our present state of ignorance and depravity."² Reason is now a very inadequate guide. "There is nothing in revelation contrary to reason, though there are things above it, and of which it is not a competent judge, and therefore can be no guide in such matters."³ Men need a revelation to give them a clearer knowledge of God, of moral duties, of the immortality of the soul, and especially of the way of salvation. On this last point, reason leaves men in utter darkness; for, while it assures them that they are sinners and need forgiveness, it can afford no satisfactory answer to the questions, whether God will forgive, and if so, how, and on what conditions. On the most important of all subjects, then, reason is utterly at fault; and on many others it sheds only a dim and insufficient light; hence the urgent necessity for a revelation.⁴

Inspiration of the Scriptures. Not the whole which the Bible contains is inspired, i. e. the speeches of Satan, and of bad men.⁵ Dr. Gill, however, does not mean to deny, that those who recorded these speeches, were inspired to make the record; but only that their authors were inspired in uttering them. Dr. Gill held the most extreme form of the doctrine of verbal inspiration. "Not the matter of the Scriptures only, but the very words in which they are written, are of God. Some, who are not for 'organical' inspiration, as they call it, think that the sacred writers were only furnished of God with matter, and had general ideas of things given them, and were left to clothe them with their own

¹ Bod. Div. p. 59. ² Ibid. ³ Ibid. ⁴ Ibid. pp. 60-62. ⁵ Ibid. p. 43.

words ; but if this was the case, as it sometimes is with men, that they have clear and satisfactory ideas of things, in their own minds, and yet are at a loss for proper words to express and convey the sense of them to others ; so it might be with the sacred writers, if words were not suggested to them as well as matter, and then we should be left at an uncertainty about the real sense of the Holy Spirit, if not led into a wrong one.”¹ To the objection derived from the diversity of style among the sacred writers, Dr. Gill replies : “ As it was easy for God to direct to the use of proper words, so he could accommodate himself to the style such persons were wont to use, and which was natural to them, and agreeable to their genius and circumstances.”²

The perfection of the Bible. It is not perfect in the sense, that it gives a full knowledge of God’s character and ways ; or that it contains all his communications to men ; or a record of all the words and acts of Christ ; but it is perfect, relatively to the end for which it was given : it reveals all which it is necessary, or important for men to believe and to do ; is “ a perfect standard of faith and practice. There is in it nothing superfluous and nothing defective.”³

The perspicuity of the Bible. All parts of it are not equally clear and plain. Some things are obscure, but may be understood by comparison with those that are plain ; some doctrines are not expressed in so many words, but are readily inferred, as a necessary consequence from facts which are plainly revealed. But the Scriptures are not and were not designed to be “ clear and plain to learned or unlearned, without the Spirit of God, the dictator of them.”⁴ It is no valid objection to the Bible, that it contains “ some things hard to be understood.” “ This is so ordered on purpose to remove all contempt and loathing of the Scriptures, and to humble the pride and arrogance of men ; to engage reverence of them, and to excite attention to them, and to put men on searching them with close study, application, and prayer.”⁵

Interpretation of the Bible. The Scripture is the best inter-

¹ Bod. Div. p. 44. ² Ibid. p. 44. ³ Ibid. p. 52. ⁴ Ibid. p. 57. ⁵ Ibid. p. 59.

preter of Scripture, or the Spirit of God therein; nor are the church, nor its pastors, nor councils and popes, the infallible interpreters thereof; there is a private interpretation of Scripture, which every Christian may make according to his ability and light; and there is a public one, by the preacher of the word; but both are subject to, and to be determined by, the Scripture itself, which is the only certain and infallible rule of faith and practice."¹

Dr. Gill's defence of the inspiration and authority of the Bible was not without its value in his day; but would avail little against the attacks of modern infidels and neologists; nor will it bear any comparison with the numerous critical and profound treatises which those attacks have called forth. It is interesting to observe the progress made in the science of biblical criticism, since such men as Baxter and Gill made their contributions to it. We are not troubled to see the old fortifications, thrown up around the word of God centuries ago, battered down by the enemy, so long as we find them replaced by munitions which defy the fiercest assault, and are every year becoming more and more impregnable.

IV. *The Trinity.*

"This is a doctrine of pure revelation; what natural reason could never have discovered."² It is an eminently practical doctrine, and not, as some suppose, a mere barren dogma of speculative philosophy. "The doctrine of the Trinity is often represented as a speculative point, of no great moment whether it be believed or not, too mysterious to be pryed into; and that it had been better be let alone than meddled with; but, alas! it enters into the whole of our salvation, and all the parts of it; into all the doctrines of the gospel, and into the experience of the saints; there is no doing without it."³

Nature of the Trinity. It is "not merely nominal, one God having three names; nor merely modal," one God sub-

¹ Bod. Div. p. 59. ² Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 2. ³ Bod. Div. p. 232.

sisting and revealing himself in three modes, "but personal." "The three in the Godhead are not barely three modes, but three distinct persons, in a different mode of subsisting."¹ "The Divine nature in which the Divine persons subsist, is one and common to all; the nature of the Son is the same with that of the Father, and the nature of the Spirit is the same with that of the Father and the Son; and this nature which they in common partake of, is undivided; it is not parted between them, so that one has one part, and another a second, and another a third; but the whole fulness of the Godhead is in each."² This personal distinction in the Godhead is *eternal*, not arising from, nor depending upon, the Divine will, nor upon any works done in time. "If there had never been a creature made, nor a soul saved, nor a sinner sanctified, God would have been the same he is, three persons in one God. In the economy of man's salvation, to which some ascribe the distinctions of persons, as taking its rise from thence, the three persons are manifested, but not made, nor made distinct, but were so before, and would have been so, if that had never taken place." "The distinction in him [God] is by necessity of nature."³ Sabellianism finds no quarter at the hands of Dr. Gill. And on the whole subject of the interior economy of the Godhead, he speaks, not irreverently, but with something of the confident and dogmatic tone of one who felt that by searching he had found out God to perfection.

With regard to the use of the term *person*, to designate the distinctions in the Godhead, he adopted substantially the views of Calvin.⁴ "There seems no reason to lay aside the use of this word [person]. I am not, however, so at-

¹ Bod. Div. p. 236.

² Ibid. p. 238.

³ Ibid. p. 237.

⁴ "If then the words (Trinity and Person) have not been rashly invented, we should beware lest we be convicted of fastidious tenacity in rejecting them. I could, indeed, wish them to be buried in oblivion, provided this faith were universally received, that the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one God; and that, nevertheless, the Son is not the Father, nor the Spirit the Son, but they are distinguished from each other by some peculiar property. I am not so rigidly precise as to be fond of contending for mere words."—Calvin's Inst., B. I. Ch. 13, § 5.

tached to it, but that I could part with it provided a more apt and suitable word was substituted in its room, whereby a real distinction in the Deity might be maintained; though it is a difficult thing to change words in such an important article as this, without altering the sense of it. It is a rule, that in many instances holds good, *Qui fingit nova verba, nova gignit dogmata.*"¹

What is the ground of the personal distinctions in the Godhead? "It is the personal relations, or distinctive relative properties, which belong to each person, which distinguish them one from another; as *paternity* in the first person, *filiation* in the second, and *spiration* in the third." "If one of these distinct persons is a Father in the Divine nature, and another a Son in the Divine nature, there must be something in the Divine nature which is the ground of the relation, and distinguishes the one from the other, and can be nothing else than *generation*, and which distinguishes the third person from them both, as neither begetting nor begotten." "From *generation* arises the relation; and from relation, distinct personality."²

According to Dr. Gill, the trinity of the Godhead depends upon, or arises from, the eternal generation of the Son. "Upon the whole, it is easy to observe that the distinction of persons in the Deity depends on the generation of the Son; take away that which would destroy the relation between the first and the second, and the distinction drops."³ "It [the Sonship of Christ by eternal generation] is the distinguishing criterion of the Christian religion, and what gives it the preference to all others, and upon which all the important doctrines of it depend. Without this, the doctrine of the

¹ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 27.

² Bod. Div. p. 238. According to the ancient terminology "The word *οὐσία* (essentia, substantia) denotes what is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the abstract; the word *ὑπόστασις* (persona) signifies the individual, concrete. Each person possesses some peculiarity (*ιδιότης*) by which it is distinguished from the other persons, notwithstanding the existing sameness of essence. Thus undervived existence (*ἀγεννησία*) belongs to the Father; generation (*γέννησις*) to the Son; and procession (*ἐκπόρευσις, ἐκπεμψις*) to the Holy Spirit."—Hagenbach's History of Doctrines, Vol. I. p. 284.

³ Bod. Div. p. 238.

Trinity can never be supported; for without this the distinction of persons in the Trinity can never be maintained; and indeed, without this there is none at all. A writer of the present age pretends to hold the doctrine of three distinct persons in the Deity, and yet explodes this; a strange paradox!" "Without his [Christ's] eternal generation, no proof can be made of his being a distinct Divine person in the Godhead."¹

The nature of the generation of the Son. "Between the Divine and human generation, there is some resemblance, as likeness, sameness of nature, personality, etc.," "but care must be taken to remove from our minds everything carnal and impure, and what implies an imperfection; as division of nature, multiplication of essence, priority and posteriority,

¹ Bod. Div. p. 241. Dr. Gill follows the early Fathers in attaching great importance to the doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son, and in deeming it essential to the development and defence of the doctrine of the Trinity. Probably few theologians of the present day deem it "a strange paradox," to hold to the doctrine of three distinct persons in the Deity, and at the same time, reject the doctrine of eternal generation. The threefold personal distinction in the Godhead is essential to the Trinity; but the necessity, or advantage of making that distinction depend upon eternal generation is not apparent to many. Even those divines who believe that the Scriptural phrases, "Son of God," "Begotten of the Father," etc., refer, not to the humanity, nor to the Messiahship of the Word, but to his divine nature, are little disposed to adopt the Nicene terminology on this subject. How far they really differ in substance of doctrine from the Nicene Fathers, it may not be easy to say. They hold to a threefold distinction in the very nature of the Godhead, and that this distinction is personal, and eternal, and such as to justify the application of the terms Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, respectively to the three persons. And they see no gain, as they find no scriptural warrant, for going further, and saying that this distinction of persons depends on eternal generation. The distinction exists in the very nature of Deity, and therefore exists of necessity; and therefore does not properly depend on anything. It is objected to the term "generation," even when coupled with the qualifying term "eternal," that it unavoidably suggests the ideas of derivation and dependence, which are inconsistent with the idea of Supreme divinity. The Nicene Fathers had before them the difficult task of keeping clear of the Arian heresy, on the one hand, and the Sabellian heresy on the other. In opposition to Arianism they affirmed a sameness of essence; and in opposition to Sabellianism, they affirmed a distinction of persons. To defend the reality of this distinction, it was deemed necessary to show what was the peculiarity of each of the three persons. Hence was developed the doctrine of eternal generation. But its supposed necessity is not now apparent to the ablest Trinitarian divines. In maintaining the doctrine of the Trinity they deem it enough to affirm a distinction in the very nature of the Godhead, which is personal and eternal.

motion, mutation, alteration, corruption, diminution, cessation from operation, etc." "To reason from the one to the other without limitation, restriction, care, and caution, is very unsafe and dangerous; since it may lead unawares into foolish and hurtful errors."¹ After making due "limitation and restriction," it is difficult to see what more the phrase "eternal generation" can mean than is meant by the phrase "eternal distinction." If generation is not generation except in a very qualified and figurative sense; then why not let the less objectional term "distinction" indicate that sense? Dr. Gill confesses his ignorance of the real nature of that which he calls "generation." "As for the modus, or manner of it, we must be content to remain ignorant of it."² And yet, notwithstanding this disclaimer, he sought to clear up the mystery by likening it, as did the early fathers, to the generation of thought by the mind, and to the generation of light by the sun.³

What is generated? "Whose [the Son's] generation, must be understood, not of his nature, for his nature is the same with the nature of the Father and Spirit; and therefore if his was begotten, theirs would be also; but of his person; as in natural, so in Divine generation, person begets person, and not essence begets essence."⁴ "The Divine essence neither begets, nor is begotten. It is a Divine person in the essence, that begets, and a Divine person in that essence, that is begotten. Essence does not beget essence, but person begets person; otherwise there would be more than one essence, whereas, though there are more persons than one, yet there is no more than one essence. A late writer has, therefore, wrongly represented us as holding that the Divinity of Christ is begotten."⁵

¹ Bod. Div. pp. 244, 245. ² Ibid. p. 261. ³ Ibid. p. 244. ⁴ Ibid. p. 261.

⁵ The writer alluded to "wrongly represented" Dr. Gill on this point, only so far as he himself manifestly departed from the Nicene doctrine. With some few exceptions, the Fathers, during that period in which the Nicene creed was the recognized symbol of the faith of the church, hold that generation related, not to the *personality* of the Son, merely, but to the divine *substance*, or *essence*. According to Dr. Gill and many modern divines, not the essence (*οὐσία*) of the Son is generated by the Father, but personality (*ὑπόστασις*). Here is an important de-

V. *Decrees.*

The decrees of God are "his purposes," "the determinations of his mind," "what he has fixed, settled, and resolved upon," "not merely ideas of things future."

They are *voluntary*. "They are free acts of his will, without any force or compulsion, and are not influenced by any motive from without himself."

They are *eternal*. "God's decrees are himself decreeing; and therefore if he is from everlasting, they are so likewise." They are *most wise*, "laid in the deepest wisdom, though unsearchable by us, and may be unaccountable to us."¹ They are *immutable*, "always effectual; cannot be frustrated or disannulled." "There are no wishes, would-bes, or feeble vellities in God; he does whatever he pleases and wills."²

They are *universal*. "They reach to all things that come to pass in the world, from the beginning to the end of it," "good and bad," "the least as well as the greatest."³ On the point of God's decreeing or willing *sin*, Dr. Gill thus states and explains his views. "To set this affair in the best light, it will be proper to consider what is in sin and relative to it: there is the *act* of sin, and there is the *guilt* of sin, which is an obligation to punishment, and the punishment itself. Concerning the two last, there can be no difficulty, (*viz.*) that God should will that men that sin should be-

parture from the ancient doctrine. "Indeed the whole tenor of the writings of the Ancient Fathers, who defend the Nicene creed, puts it beyond reasonable doubt that they held a communication of the substance (*ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας*) of the Father to the Son; on which account the Son was and is God, and the object of divine worship. The modern view of Trinitarians, *viz.*, that the Father begets only the personality (*ὁμοούσιος, persona, πρόσωπον*) of the Son and Spirit, is a nicety in philosophical discussion, from which the Ancient Fathers were at a great remove. That the Father communicated the whole of himself to the Son, *οὐσιωδῶς substantialiter*, is what they assert so often and in so many ways, that doubt concerning it would seem to be impossible."—Prof. Stuart, in *Bib. Repository*, Vol. v. p. 291. It is thus evident, that many who retain the old terminology on this subject, do not retain the old doctrine in its integrity; while many who reject the old terminology, retain the substance of the old doctrine, all of it that is essential to the Trinity. Terms may be changed without change of doctrine; and doctrine may be modified without any change of terms.

¹ *Bod. Div. Book II. Ch. I.* ² *Ibid. B. I. p. 137.* ³ *Ibid. B. II. Ch. I.*

come guilty; and that he should will the punishment of them. The only difficulty is about the *act* of sin; and this may be considered either as natural or moral, or the *act* and the *ataxy*, disorder, irregularity, and vitiosity of it; as an action barely considered, it is of God, and according to his will, without which and the concurrence of his providence, none can be performed; he is the fountain and source of all action and motion; in him, all "live and move and have their being;" "but then the vitiosity and irregularity of it, as it is an aberration from the law of God and a transgression of it, is of men only; and God cannot be said to will this; he forbids it, he abhors it and detests it, he takes no pleasure in it, he is of purer eyes than even to behold it with approbation and delight; God cannot will it as sin, or for the sake of itself; but (as an act) for the sake of some good to be brought through it, as the fall of Adam for the glorifying of his justice and mercy, in punishing some of his posterity and saving others. And besides, God may will one sin as a punishment for another." "Once more, though God may be said, in such senses to will sin, yet he wills it in a different way than he wills that which is good: he does not will to do it himself, nor to do it by others, but permits it to be done; and which is not a bare permission, but a voluntary permission, and is expressed by God's giving up men to their own hearts' lusts. He wills it, not by his effective will, but by his permissive will, and therefore cannot be chargeable with being the author of sin; since there is a wide difference between doing it himself, or doing it by others, or ordering it to be done, which only can make him the author of sin; and voluntarily permitting or suffering it to be done by others."¹ Dr. Gill does not carry out his views on this point with entire consistency. He makes the sinfulness of sinful actions, "the ataxy, disorder, irregularity, and vitiosity" of them, an exception to the Divine decrees: "God cannot be said to will this." He does not will it, either by his "effective or permissive will;" either "for its own sake,"

¹ Bod. Div. pp. 134-136.

or "for the sake of some good to be brought about through it." It is, then, only the actions "barely considered;" that is, considered merely as natural actions, irrespective of their moral character, that he wills or decrees; and, as such, does he not will them by his effective will? is he not the author of them? The great difficulty with this whole theory is, that the sinfulness of a sinful act, cannot thus be distinguished from the act itself, so that the one can be assigned to one being, as its author, and the other to another. The great problem is, to include sin in the Divine decrees, without making God its author. The theory of Dr. Gill, most persons will probably think, fails to offer a satisfactory solution of the problem.

Election "is the choice of certain persons, by God, from all eternity, to grace and glory." "The reason why men are elected, is not because Christ has shed his blood for them, redeemed and saved them; but Christ has done all this for them, because they are elected."¹ "It is wholly owing to the will and pleasure of God, and not to the faith, holiness, obedience, and good works of men, nor to a foresight of all or any of these."² "It is absolute and unconditional, irrespective of anything in men, as the cause and condition of it."³ Dr. Gill discusses at length the question, "whether men were considered in the mind of God, in the decree of election, as fallen or unfallen, as in the corrupt mass through the fall, or in the pure mass of creatorship previous to it, and as to be created." While he says that the latter theory "seems best," he yet thinks the difference between the two "is not so great as may be thought, at first sight;" and that their respective advocates "should not charge one another with unsoundness and heterodoxy."⁴ He professes to occupy a middle ground between them. "For my own part, I think both [the supralapsarian and the sublapsarian theories] may be taken in; that in the decree of the end, the ultimate end, the glory of God, for which he does all things, men might be considered, in the

¹ Bod. Div. p. 296.

² Ibid. p. 302.

³ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 263.

⁴ Bod. Div. p. 302.

Divine mind, as creatable, yet not created and fallen ; and that, in the decree of the means, which among other things takes in the mediation of Christ, redemption by him, and the sanctification of the Spirit, they might be considered as created, fallen, and sinful, which these things imply ; nor does this suppose separate acts and decrees in God, or any priority and posteriority in them, which in God are but one and together ; but our finite minds are obliged to consider them one after another, not being able to take them in together and at once.”¹

Reprobation. Dr. Gill prefers the term *rejection* to *reprobation*, for several reasons, but “chiefly because the other word, reprobation, through wrong and frightful ideas being affixed to it, carries with it a sound harsh and disagreeable.”² The decree of rejection consists of two parts, “preterition” and “predamnation.”

“*Preterition* is God’s passing by some men, when he chose others ; in this act, sin comes not into consideration ; for men are considered as not created, and so as not fallen ; it is a pure act of sovereignty.”³

“*Predamnation* is God’s appointment, or preordination of man to condemnation for sin.” “In the act of predamnation, he [God] considers him [man] as a sinner, and foreordains him to punishment for his sins ; and if it is no injustice in God to punish men for sin, it cannot be unjust in him to determine to punish for it.”⁴ “God damns men, but for sin, and he decreed to damn none but for sin.” “Sin is the cause of the thing decreed, damnation.”⁵ Thus, by his modified supralapsarianism, Dr. Gill sought to obviate the charge, that God created some men to damn them. He created them neither to damn nor to save them, but for his own glory. That end is secured, in the case of the lost, by passing them by in the decree of election, and by decreeing to inflict, and by actually inflicting, upon them, the punishment which their sins deserve.

¹ Bod. Div. p. 303. ² Ibid. p. 313. ³ Ibid. p. 317. ⁴ Ibid. p. 320.

⁵ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 265.

VI. *Sin.*

Original sin. Dr. Gill's views on this topic will be sufficiently developed, by exhibiting his views of imputation. But to form a correct estimate of his views of imputation, it will be needful to have distinctly before our minds the two forms of this doctrine which have extensively prevailed in the church. We shall therefore be contributing to one main object in this Article, if we here give a brief statement of what may be called the ancient and the modern doctrine of imputation.

The ancient doctrine may be thus stated: The human race was created as a unity. All mankind were coexistent in Adam and coagent in the apostasy. It was not Adam as a person, but human nature inclusive of Adam and all his posterity, that sinned in the garden. All participated in the first transgression, and were all equally involved in the guilt and condemnation of it. The sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity because it is also their sin. They were all guilty sharers in it. It is imputed to them for precisely the same reason that it was imputed to Adam, viz. that they really committed it. It is truly and properly their sin. They are justly chargeable with it, on the ground of their real, though not personal, participation in it. Into this ancient doctrine of imputation, three things enter as fundamental to it. *First*: The oneness of the human race, according to the conception of the Realistic philosophy. *Secondly*: The voluntariness of all sin. The individual is located in Adam, in order that he may there voluntarily share in the first sin. *Thirdly*: Only the individual's own sin can be justly imputed to him; he can be charged with, and be held guilty of that, and only that, sin which he has himself committed. This is unquestionably the old doctrine of imputation, first developed in definite, scientific statements by Augustine, adopted generally by the Schoolmen and the Reformers, and distinctly embodied in the symbol of the Westminster divines.¹

¹ Origen, and some few of the early fathers, accounted for the imputation of
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The modern theory of imputation, though often confounded with that of Augustine, is yet radically different

original sin to men at birth, on the ground of their preëxistence in another world, where they had individually sinned. Augustine accounted for it, on the ground of their preëxistence in Adam, in whom they all sinned. So explicitly and repeatedly does this eminent Latin father express his views on this point, that it is not easy to mistake them. "In Adam all have sinned, as all were that one man" (De Pec. Mer. I. 10). "We were all in that one man, since we were all that one man, who lapsed into sin, through that woman, who was made from him, previous to transgression. The form in which we were to live as individuals, had not been created and assigned to us, man by man, but that seminal nature was in existence, from which we were to be propagated" (De Civ. Dei. XIII 14). In his Retractions he says: "infants belong to the human nature, and are guilty of original sin, because human nature sinned in our first parents." That the real doctrine of Augustine, was what these passages imply, is attested by the most competent witnesses. The testimony of Neander is clear and sufficient: "Augustine supposed, not only that this bondage under the principle of sin, by which sin is its own punishment, was transmitted by the progenitor of the race to his posterity; but also that the first transgression, as an act, was to be imputed to the whole human race — that the guilt and penalty were propagated from one to all. This participation of all in Adam's transgression, Augustine made clear to his own mind in this way: Adam was the representative of the whole race, and bore in himself *the entire human nature* and kind in the germ, since it was from him it unfolded itself. And this theory would easily blend with Augustine's speculative form of thought, as he had appropriated to himself the Platonic-Aristotelian Realism in the doctrine of general conceptions, and conceived of general conceptions as the original types of the kind realized in individual things. Furthermore, his slight acquaintance with the Greek language, and his habit of reading the Holy Scriptures in the Latin translation, led him to find a confirmation of his theory in a falsely translated passage of the Epistle to the Romans, 5: 12." (Neander's Church History, Vol. II. p. 609). We have the amplest authority for saying that the early and prevalent doctrine of the church, till a comparatively recent period, was as stated above. "The oldest hypothesis" (of imputation) "is that which affirmed that all the posterity of Adam were, in the most literal sense, already *in him*, and sinned in him — in his person; and that Adam's sin is therefore justly imputed by God to all his posterity." "It was the prevailing theory among the schoolmen, and even throughout the sixteenth century, and until about the middle of the seventeenth, when it was contested by the French reformed theologians, Joshua Placcæus and Moses Amyraldus, who, however, were violently opposed" (Knapp's Theology, pp 275, 276). "Any one who will take the pains to study the doctrine of original sin, and to trace its development, will find that the more profound minds in the Christian church have ever sought to relieve the subject of those difficulties which encompass it by this doctrine of the oneness of Adam with his posterity" (Prof. Shedd's Discourses and Essays, Art. Original Sin). "Yet, shadowy and baseless as is this theory, upon it for centuries the doctrine of the Western church as to original sin, and also all the doctrines which grow out of it, were made to rest" (Dr. Beecher's Conflict of Ages, p. 301).

from it. It may be thus stated : Adam was the federal head and legal representative of the race. He was on trial, not for himself alone, but for all his posterity. The covenant made with him, was made with him not as a private individual, but as a public character, as the representative of the entire human family. His sin therefore is judicially reckoned, or imputed, to the whole party represented in him. All the posterity of Adam are charged with the sin committed by Adam alone, and condemned and punished for it. They are treated as if they had, themselves, actually participated in the apostasy of their progenitor.¹ This theory denies each of the three fundamental principles of the ancient doctrine. It denies the literal oneness of the race in Adam ; it denies the necessary voluntariness of sin ; and it denies that the individual's own sin — that which he has himself committed — is the only sin that can justly be imputed to him.

The two theories of imputation are thus radically diverse, and really have little in common, except the broad fact that the evil consequences of the first transgression are visited upon, or experienced by, the entire race. The Augustinian theory imputes to men the sin which is really and properly theirs ; the modern theory imputes to them the sin which is not theirs, but another's. The Augustinian doctrine represents God as treating men at birth as sinners, because they really are such : the modern doctrine represents God as treating men at birth as sinners, though he knows they never sinned. The Augustinian doctrine employs the term "sinful," "guilty," and "impute," in their literal and proper signification ; the modern doctrine employs these terms in an arbitrary and unnatural sense.

But while there is such a radical and irreconcilable difference between these two theories of imputation, we find that some men, of great logical acumen, have failed to note this

¹ "This theory was invented by some Schoolmen, and has been adopted by many in the Romish and Protestant church since the sixteenth century." Knapp's *Theology*, p. 276. This form of the doctrine of imputation has been held for the last two centuries by most of the leading Scotch divines ; and in this country is tenaciously held by not a few, who complacently, but mistakenly, claim to be the true representatives of the Calvinistic or Augustinian theology.

difference ; and have employed the peculiar phraseology of them both, apparently advocating, now the one, and now the other. We have an instance of this in Dr. Gill. He may be cited as an advocate either of the ancient or the modern doctrine. We will first show that he was, on this point, an Augustinian. (a) He freely employs the peculiar terms and phrases of the ancient doctrine. "They [mankind] were all in Adam, and sinned in him, as one man."¹ "All his [Adam's] posterity sinned in him."² "All equally sinned in him."³ "All men were naturally and seminally in him ; as he was the common parent of mankind, *he had all human nature in him*, and was *also* the covenant head and representative of all his posterity : so they were in him, both naturally and federally, and so sinned in him and fell with him, by his first transgression, into condemnation and death."⁴ This is certainly the phraseology of the Augustinian doctrine ; and whoever employs it in a scientific statement, or philosophical discussion of the doctrine, must be supposed to employ it in its well-established historical sense.

(b) The theory of *spermatie animalcula*, by which Dr. Gill explains and accounts for the oneness of the race in Adam, proves that he held to a real and literal oneness, according to the ancient doctrine. "They [mankind] were in him [Adam] both seminally and federally ; and it is their being in him seminally, that is the foundation of their being in him federally, and makes it reasonable that so it should be ; and this may be greatly illustrated and confirmed by modern philosophy, according to which all kinds of plants of the same sort to be produced in all following ages, were actually formed in the first seed that was created ; and all the *stamina* and *semina*, not only of plants but of animals, and so of men, were originally formed by the Almighty Parent, within the first of each respective kind ; and to be the seed of all future generations. Thus all mankind being formed in the first man, in this manner, it easily accounts for it, how they came to have a share in the guilt of his sin ; and that

¹ Bod. Div. p. 534.

² Ibid. p. 547.

³ Ibid. p. 536.

⁴ Com. Rom. 5: 12.

to be imputed to them ; as also to have the corruption and pollution of it derived to them.”¹ “ According to modern philosophy, which agrees with the sacred philosophy, all the animalculæ from which millions of men spring, in all ages, were originally formed, by the great Creator, in the first man ; which accounts for the guilt and pollution of all men in him.”²

Now it is a matter of history that the advocates of the Augustinian doctrine did adopt this *seminal* theory, to explain that oneness of the race in Adam, which is the ground of the imputation of the guilt of the first transgression to all.³ And surely this theory would be wholly impertinent in illustration of a federal or representative unity of the race. From its use by Dr. Gill, therefore, we infer that he held the ancient doctrine that all men, literally, were in Adam and sinned in him.

(c) Dr. Gill's defence of the justice of God, in regard to that corruption of nature with which all men are born, belongs legitimately to the ancient doctrine, and to no other. That want of original righteousness, which leads to positive corruption of nature, is a punishment, deserved by each individual, for having sinned in Adam. “ They were all in him and sinned in him as one man, so that it was but just that they should be deprived, as he, of the glory of God ; that is, of the image of God, which chiefly lay in original righteousness, an inclination to good, and a power to perform it.”⁴ “ And in this light, we are to consider the corruption of nature ; a moral death, which is no other than a deprivation of the image of God, a loss of original righteousness, and an incapacity to attain to it, was threatened to Adam, and inflicted on him as a punishment. And since all his posterity sinned in him, why should not the same pass upon them ?”⁵ This is sound reasoning according to the old theology. All shared in Adam's sin, being literally in him ; why then should they not share, with him, the threatened punishment ?

¹ Bod. Div. p. 524.

² Ibid. p. 617.

³ Knapp's Theology, p. 276.

⁴ Bod. Div. p. 534.

⁵ Ibid. p. 536.

We will now proceed to adduce evidence, from the works of Dr. Gill, which certainly seems to place him in the ranks of those who advocate the modern doctrine of imputation.

(a) His definition of imputation is that of the modern school. "Imputation is not used by us in a moral sense, as when a man's own personal action, good or bad, is accounted to himself; but in a forensic sense, as when the debts of one man are, in a legal way, transferred and placed to the account of another."¹ "And this imputation is not to be considered, in a moral sense, as the action of a man committed by himself, whether good or bad, is adjudged and reckoned unto him," "but in a forensic, judicial, and law-sense, as when one man's debts are, in a legal way, placed to the account of another, as if they were his, though not personally contracted by him. An instance of this we have in the Apostle Paul, who said to Philemon, concerning Onesimus, 'If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee anything (ἐλλόγει), let it be imputed to me, or put to my account.' And thus the posterity of Adam are made sinners by Adam's disobedience, that being imputed to them and put to their account, as if it had been committed by them personally, though it was not."² "This act of imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, makes men sinners not *inherently*, but *imputatively*; it puts no sin in them, though it reckons it to them."³

(b) Dr. Gill makes the federal headship of Adam the ground of the imputation of his sin to his posterity; a fundamental point in the modern doctrine. "God gave a law to Adam which was in the form of a covenant, and in which Adam stood as a covenant head to all his posterity."⁴ "In this covenant, Adam acted not as a private individual, for himself only, but as a federal head and representative of his whole posterity."⁵ "The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, is not his being the natural head and common parent of them (for so are immediate parents to their respective offspring, but their particular sins are not

¹ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 149.

² Bod. Div. p. 524.

³ Bod. Div. p. 525.

⁴ Ibid. p. 497.

⁵ Ibid. p. 503.

imputed to them. Adam being the common parent of mankind, may be considered as the ground of the derivation of a corrupt nature; and yet the justice of that, will not clearly appear, without their being considered as made sinners by the imputation of Adam's sin to them), but the ground of this imputation is the federal headship of Adam, or his standing as a covenant head to all his posterity; so that what he did, as such, is reckoned as if done of them."¹

Dr. Gill thinks this procedure, on the part of God, to be just, for several reasons; especially because (1) of Adam's fitness to be the representative of mankind. "Who so fit for it, as the first man, the common parent of mankind, made after the image of God, so wise, so holy, so good; and could it have been possible for all men to have been upon the spot at once, and it had been proposed to them, to choose a head and representative, who would they, who could they have chose, but the first man, that was their natural parent, of whose blood they were made, and who, they might reasonably think, had the most tender affection for them, and would take the greatest care of them and of their good, put into his hands? So that it is reasonable to conclude they would all, to a man, have united in the choice of him."² And (2) If Adam had stood, the advantages to them would have been as great, as the disadvantages now are. "If Adam had stood in his integrity, they would have partook of all the blessed consequences of his standing, and enjoyed all the happiness that he did; and therefore should not murmur, nor esteem it any injustice in God, in putting their affairs in his hands, that they share the miseries of his fall."³

(c) Dr. Gill, in common with all the advocates of the modern doctrine, makes the imputation of Adam's sin, precisely parallel with the imputation of Christ's righteousness. "As men are made righteous, in a forensic sense, or are justified, and have a right to life, through the righteousness or obedience of Christ, so they are made sinners, in a foren-

¹ Bod. Div. p. 525.

² *Ibid.* p. 504; also *Sermons and Tracts*, Vol. II. p. 122.

³ Bod. Div. p. 504.

sic sense, by the disobedience of Adam ; that is, by imputation."¹ "Add to this, that, in the same way that Christ's righteousness comes upon us, which is by imputation, Adam's sin enters into us and becomes ours."²

(d) Dr. Gill denies the only two suppositions upon which it is possible for men to have sinned in Adam. He denies, in the first place, that the souls of men were created in Adam and propagated from him. He is a decided creationist, and says : traducianism is a theory "too big with absurdities to be admitted."³ And in the second place he denies that the body sinned or is sinful, before united to the soul. "The body, antecedent to its union with a rational soul, is no other than a brute, an animal, like other animals, and is not a subject, either of moral good, or moral evil ; as it comes of a corrupt body, and is of a corruptible seed, it has in it the seeds of many evils, as other animals have, according to their nature ; but then these are natural evils, not moral ones ; as the savageness, fierceness, and cruelty of bears, wolves, etc. But when this body comes to be united to a rational soul, it becomes then a part of a rational creature, it comes under law, and its nature not being conformable to that law, its nature and the evils and vitiosities of it are formally sinful."⁴

Traducianism obviates one of the principal difficulties which encompass the ancient doctrine of imputation. If the souls of all men existed in Adam, the affirmation that they sinned in him, can be made with less palpable absurdity. Still Augustine was not an avowed traducianist ; and the most positive creationists have believed that men sinned in Adam and are guilty of his sin. Of course then, they believed in corporeal sins ; our bodies existed in Adam, and our bodies sinned in him. Dr. Gill's explicit denial, therefore, that the body, antecedent to its union with the soul, is a subject of moral evil, implies that he held that men sinned in Adam, not really, but only figuratively, that is, repre-

¹ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 150.

² Bod. Div. p. 532.

³ Com. Rom. 5: 12.

⁴ Ibid. p. 533.

sentatively ; which is the modern doctrine, that has, in many instances, wholly displaced the ancient one.

The interesting inquiry here arises : How can we account for the fact that so able a divine as Dr. Gill held two theories so radically diverse ? Inconsistency in strong-minded men is no uncommon thing. The most eminent philosophers and theologians, are liable to the charge.

This phenomenon finds a partial explanation in the natural limitations of the human mind. The most clear-sighted minds cannot easily survey some subjects on all sides at the same time. Great comprehensiveness of view may fall short of the theme ; and the most subtle analysis may overlook important distinctions. The ablest thinkers are thus encompassed with infirmity ; and when, on some particular point, they fall into gross inconsistencies, it is "not as though some strange thing happened to them."

But inconsistency often arises, and is almost sure to arise, from the adoption of views which involve essential error. It is nearly impossible to be a thoroughly consistent advocate of false doctrine. The fundamental laws of belief, and the natural instincts of the soul, are for truth ; and will, sooner or later, resent any violence done them. At times they will assert their rights ; and, by a rebound from errors, are likely to carry the mind across the line of truth to an opposite error. The man who adopts the theory, that we literally and morally sinned in Adam, six thousand years before we were born, must, at times, in some way, find relief from its absurdity. It requires an unnatural effort of mind to advocate such a theory, which cannot be constant. A forced logic will break down, or lead those who press it into their service, through devious paths, and make them cross and recross their own track. To suppose sin, where in the nature of things real sin is impossible, compels a resort to the notion of a figurative, unreal, or imputed sin. It is but natural, therefore, that the mind should swing backward and forward, from the theory of a real oneness of the race in Adam, to the theory of a representative oneness. There is relief even in

shifting from one false doctrine to another. The moral nature gains, at the expense of logical consistency.

But it is especially by the pressure of objections, raised by opponents, that Dr. Gill is driven from one theory of imputation to the other. To the objection that we had no share in Adam's sin, since we did not then exist, Dr. Gill replies that we did then exist *seminally*, and in this seminal state sinned. To the objection, that this involves the doctrine of corporeal sins, Dr. Gill replies, that we were in Adam both *seminally* and *federally*; and "being in him *seminally* is the foundation of our being in him *federally*." And it was as being in him *federally* that we sinned; that is, we did not really sin in him at all; but he, being our federal head, we may figuratively be said to have been in him; and therefore his sin is imputed to us. Thus, to escape from the objector, Dr. Gill makes the passage, step by step, from the old doctrine to the new. But the objector still pursues him, and asks for the justice of reckoning to us a sin in which we had no concern; his reply is, that we had a concern in the sin of Adam; "we were in him *federally*, because we were in him *seminally*; and being in him *seminally*, we shared in his transgression, and therefore it is justly reckoned to us." And thus he comes directly back to the old doctrine of a literal and proper sin, committed by us in Adam, and imputed to us because it is our own. In this way, we may suppose Dr. Gill was led to advocate, at different times, both theories of imputation. To escape from the difficulties of the old theory, he took refuge in the new; and to escape from the difficulties of the new theory, he took refuge in the old; as a man attacked by a [superior foe, will flee from one indefensible fortress to another, and then back again.

Actual sins. "From the sin of Adam arises the corruption of nature, with which all mankind, descending from him by ordinary generation, are infected; and from the corruption of nature, or indwelling sin, arise many actual sins and iniquities." "These actual sins are the birth of corrupt nature, which is like a woman that conceives, bears,

and brings forth.”¹ “Actions as natural actions are not sinful, for all actions or motions are of God, the first cause, of whom nothing sinful comes.”² “But an action is denominated good or bad, from its agreement or disagreement with the law of God; its conformity or disconformity to it; it is the irregularity, obliquity, and aberration of the action, from the rule of the Divine law, that is sin; and this, whether of thought, word, or deed.” “And when we distinguish actual sins from original sin, we do not mean thereby that original sin is not actual. The first sins of Adam and Eve, were actual sins, transgressions of the law of God. And original sin, as derived from the sin of our first parents, is also actual; it is a want of conformity to the law of God, and is *very active and operative*; as it dwells in men, it works in them all manner of concupiscence.”³ “But actual sins are second acts that flow from the corruption of nature.” They may be distinguished into “sins against God, sins against others, and sins against ourselves.” Also into “internal and external; sins of heart, and sins of life;” also into sins of omission and sins of commission.”⁴

VII. *Redemption.*

The causes of redemption. “The *moving* cause of it, or from whence it springs and flows, is the everlasting love of God.” “The gift of Christ, to be the Redeemer of his people, flows from this love.”⁵ “The *procuring* cause, or Author of redemption, is Christ, the Son of God.” “Christ’s fitness for the work of redemption, lies in his being God and man, in one person.” “As man, he could be made, and was made, under the law, and so capable of yielding obedience to it, and of bearing the penalty of it.” “As God, he could be zealously concerned for the glory of the Divine perfections;” “could put an infinite virtue into his blood, and make it a full and adequate price for the purchase of his

¹ Bod. Div. p. 536.

² Ibid. p. 537.

³ Ibid. pp. 537—540.

⁴ This is good Hopkinsianism. See Hopkins’s System of Divinity, Ch. 8.

⁵ Bod. Div. p. 726.

church, and the redemption of it;" "could support the human nature under the load of sin and suffering, for it, through the work otherwise insupportable."¹ The *final* cause or end of redemption is, subordinately, "the salvation of the elect," and, ultimately, "the glory of God, of his grace and justice, and of all the perfections of his nature."²

The means of redemption. It is by making satisfaction, or "paying a satisfactory price into the hands of justice," that Christ redeems his people. "What Christ hath done and suffered, in the room and stead of sinners, with content, well pleasedness, and acceptance in the sight of God, is what may with propriety be called satisfaction." "There are terms and phrases which are used of Christ, and of his work, as propitiation, reconciliation, atonement, etc., which are equivalent and synonymous to satisfaction."³

The necessity of satisfaction. It is necessary, not to render God merciful, but to render the exercise of mercy towards the guilty, consistent with his character and moral government. It "does not procure the love of God, being the effect of it; yet it opens the way to the embraces of his arms, stopped by sin."⁴ "Christ has not, by his sacrifice and death, procured the love and favor of God, but has removed the obstructions, which lay in the way of love's appearing and breaking forth."⁵ "To forgive sin without satisfaction, does not accord with the perfection of God."

What is "the matter of satisfaction, or what is that which gives satisfaction to the justice of God?" It "is no other than Christ's fulfilling the whole law in the room and stead of sinners." He fulfilled the law (a) "By obeying the precepts of it, and answering all that it requires. Does it require an holy nature? It has it in him." "Does it require perfect, sinless obedience? It has it in him." To the objection that Christ, as a man, was obliged to yield obedience for himself, Dr. Gill replies that his obedience was still for his people, "since he assumed human nature for their sake." And furthermore, though obliged to obey the

¹ Bod. Div. pp. 728, 729.

² Ibid. pp. 730, 731.

³ Ibid. p. 754.

⁴ Ibid. p. 758.

⁵ Com. Rom. 3: 25.

law for himself, he was not obliged to obey it in such a state of humiliation and suffering, "for the human nature of Christ, from the moment of its union with the Son of God, was entitled to glory and happiness; so that its obedience to the law, in such a low estate, was quite voluntary."¹ (b) Christ has fulfilled the law, and satisfied it, by bearing the penalty of it, in the room and stead of his people; which is death of every kind;" "corporeal death and all that was contained in it, and connected with it." "Also those inward sufferings, when his soul as well as body was made an offering for sin, and when he sustained what is tantamount to an eternal death." "What he endured, both in the garden and on the cross, was tantamount to an eternal death, or the sufferings of the wicked in hell;" "for though they differ as to the circumstances of time and place, yet as to the essence of them, they are the same." "Eternity is not of the essence of punishment, and only takes place when the person punished cannot bear the whole at once." Satisfaction requires an infinite punishment. "And as that cannot be borne at once, by a finite creature, it is continued ad infinitum; but Christ, being an infinite person, was able to bear the whole at once; and the infinity of his person abundantly compensates for the eternity of the punishment."²

To the objection that, inasmuch as our justification is ascribed to Christ's passive obedience, it is not needful to suppose that his active obedience was an essential part of his satisfaction, Dr. Gill replies: "Christ's sufferings and death, being satisfactory to the comminatory or threatening part of the law, are reckoned to us for justification, so that we may be freed and discharged from the curse of it, and from hell and wrath to come; but as they do not constitute us righteous (i. e. holy), they do not entitle us to eternal life; but the active obedience of Christ, being imputed to us, is *unto justification of life*, or what gives the title to eternal life."³

¹ Bod. Div. p. 756.² Ibid. p. 642.³ Ibid. pp. 811, 812.

To the objection that, if Christ's active obedience satisfies the requirements of the law and entitles the sinner to eternal life, then his passive obedience is needless ; since, if the sinner had himself obeyed the law, its penalty had not been incurred, Dr. Gill replies, that it was necessary for Christ to satisfy the law in everything it could require of men, "both as creatures and as sinful creatures." "As creatures, the law requires of them purity of nature and perfect obedience to it." "As sinful creatures, it requires of them the penalty." Christ represented them, in his active obedience, and presented to the law, for them, what it could require of them as creatures ; he also represented them in his passive obedience and presented to the law for them, what it could require of them as sinful creatures. "And in both obediences, he satisfied the whole law ; and as, by the one, they are freed from death, so, by the other, they are entitled to eternal life."¹

But the proposition, "Christ bore the penalty of sin, in the room and stead of his people," is not an exhaustive statement of Dr. Gill's doctrine. According to his view, Christ not only bore the penalty of sin, but bore the sin itself ; and he bore the penalty, because he bore the sin ; sin is laid upon, or transferred to him, and then imputed to him, and then punished as his. "The punishment due to us for sin, could not have been laid upon Christ, nor could he have been wounded for our transgressions, or have been bruised for our sins, or have been oppressed and afflicted, had he not had our sins laid upon him."² "The law finding them [our sins] on him, charges him with them, and curses him for them."³ "What he [Christ] bore were *sins* ; all kinds of sin, every act of sin, and all that belongs to it, its guilt, filth, and punishment."⁴ "What Christ bore, being laid on him, *and* imputed to him, were sins, all sorts of sins, original and actual," "all that is in sin and belongs to it, the turpitude and filth of sin, and the guilt of sin, and particularly the punishment of itself."⁵

¹ Bod. Div. p. 813.

² Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 86.

³ Gal. 3: 13.

⁴ Com. Heb. 9: 28.

⁵ Bod. Div. p. 768.

Thus Dr. Gill clearly distinguishes between laying sins on Christ, and imputing sins to him. The two things are confounded, or made identical by some modern theologians, who are nevertheless wont to boast that they alone hold the ancient doctrine in its integrity. These men say, that for Christ to bear sins, is to have them imputed to him, or regarded as being laid upon and really belonging to him, though not literally transferred to him and made his. But according to Dr. Gill, who correctly represents the old doctrine, sins were first laid upon Christ, and then imputed to him; were first made his, and then charged upon him. "*The law, finding them on him, charges him with them.*" Nothing is imputed to a person until, in some way, it becomes strictly and properly his. God regards things as they really are; and never supposes sin to be upon any one, upon whom it is not, and upon whom, he well knows, that it is not. He literally lays sin upon Christ before he reckons or imputes sin to him."¹

¹ Dr. Crisp, whom Dr. Gill greatly admired, and whose works he edited, earnestly insists upon the distinction between laying sins upon Christ, and imputing sins to him. "Against such reality of transacting sin upon Christ, there is one phrase of the Apostle Paul very much objected to, and that is *imputing*; and hence some say 'God's laying of iniquity upon Christ is nothing else but God's imputing sin to him.' Now this word *imputation*, in the common understanding of people, ordinarily seems to carry something different in it from the real act of transferring sin from a believer to Christ,—it seems to signify only a supposition or connivance." "Though I have searched the Scriptures narrowly as possibly I may, yet this I find, that throughout the whole there is not one passage of it that speaks of imputing our sins to Christ." He then proceeds to show from various passages, that the word *impute* in Scripture always "hath reference to the truth and reality of the thing;" that what is said to be imputed, really belongs to him to whom it is said to be imputed.—Crisp's Sermons, London, 1791, Vol. I. pp. 457—459.

"A great deal of shuffling there is about it, that the spirits of men can hardly receive it, or take it in plain English, *that iniquity is laid upon Christ*; by it men generally conceive a kind of connivance of God, as if the Lord took notice that this, and that, and the other person indeed bear transgressions, but he forbears them, and will for the present purpose that it is upon Christ; and so by laying iniquity upon him, it must be no more, but God will be contented to esteem and think iniquity is upon him, while indeed and in truth, it remains where it was, upon the man himself that committed it. But, beloved, under favor, I must be bold to tell you that while men seek to vindicate God in one way, in this kind, they extremely abuse him in another; for if this be truth, that God only counts,

Dr. Gill also clearly distinguishes, as the foregoing extracts abundantly show, between bearing the sins of his people, and bearing the penalty of their sins. This distinction is also overlooked or denied by some modern divines. To bear our sins, they say, means only to bear the punishment of our sins. Our sins were laid upon him, only in this sense, that their penalty was laid upon him. But this is manifestly an innovation upon the old theology, which most distinctly asserts that Christ bore "*the turpitude and filth*" of sin, as well as its punishment; and that he bore the latter, because he bore the former. The penalty could not justly have been inflicted on him, had not sin itself first been laid upon or transferred to him. Transfer of sin, imputation of sin, and punishment of sin — this is the uniform and inseparable order of thought, in the old doctrine. The modern doctrine altogether rejects the idea of a literal transfer of sin, puts a figurative meaning upon the term 'imputation,' and still claims to be the ancient doctrine unchanged. Dr. Gill is, perhaps, more cautious than some others, in the use of language, in stating his views; but there can be no doubt that he held to the fundamental idea of the old doctrine of imputation of sin to Christ, viz. a literal transfer of the sin of believers to him. He even takes but slight exceptions to the strongest expressions of Dr. Crisp on this point.¹

or supposes iniquity upon Christ, whilst he knows well enough it is yet upon this and that person, and he himself bears it, mark what will follow! What will you call this esteem of God? Is it such an esteem and supposition as is righteous, or false? Certainly that all-wise and all-knowing and all-searching God hath no other thoughts of things, *than as they are.*"—Crisp's Sermons, Vol. I. pp. 449—451.

¹ "Christ himself becomes the transgressor, in the room and stead of the person that had transgressed; so that in respect of the reality of being a transgressor, Christ is as really the transgressor as the man that did commit it was before he took it upon him." "This act of God's laying it" (sin) "upon him" (Christ), "makes him as really a transgressor as if he himself had actually committed it." "The Apostle's meaning" (2 Cor. 5: 21) "was, that no transgressor was such a one as Christ was." "Some have been ready to conceive that the word iniquity in the text" (Isa. 53: 11, 12) "is spoken figuratively; iniquity, that is, the punishment of it, was laid on him; but see how careful the Spirit of God is, to take away all suspicion of a figure in the text; there are *iniquity, transgression and sin*, three words, and all spoken to the same purpose to confirm it." "You

Who are the objects of redemption? The question, so prominent in the discussions of modern theologians: 'What is the extent of the atonement?' is not precisely identical with the question of the older theologians: 'What is the extent of redemption?' The separation of the doctrine of the atonement from the more general doctrine of redemption, is comparatively recent. Formerly, it was not asked: 'For whom did Christ die?' but 'Whom did he redeem?' Still the real point at issue was substantially the same then as now, viz. Did the work of Christ have reference to all mankind, or only to a part? Did it render possible the salvation of any, who will not actually be saved?

Dr. Gill limits the work of Christ to those who will actually be saved. "The objects of election and redemption are the same." "Election and redemption are of equal extent; no more are redeemed by Christ, than are chosen in him."¹

He argues against universal redemption, on the following grounds: 1. "It highly reflects on the perfections of God."

shall never find this distinction in all the Scripture, that God laid the guilt of sin upon Christ, and not that" (sin) "itself; nay, to affirm that the Lord laid upon Christ the *guilt* of sin, and not the *sin* itself, is directly contrary to Scripture; for you have many testimonies affirming that the Lord lays *sin* upon him. What presumption, then, is it for a man to say, he lays on Christ the *guilt* and not the *sin* itself?" "If iniquity itself had not been laid upon Christ, it had been the extremest injustice in the world for the Lord to have bruised him." "Vindictive justice on a person of necessity implies some fault committed."—Crisp's Sermons, Vol. I pp. 230—240.

We love to believe that the old divines, in their better states of mind, had a right idea concealed under this startling and dangerous phraseology. Interpreted as highly figurative, as belonging to "the theology of the feelings," it may be tolerated; but when literally interpreted, we wonder not that some men have shrunk from the doctrine it expresses; even though it were to take refuge in a doctrine that makes God charge Christ with a sin which he knows is in no sense his. Nor do we wonder that other men have shrunk from both these doctrines, shocked at the idea that Christ was literally made a sinner, the greatest of all sinners; and equally shocked at the idea that God should falsely impute sin to Christ, and then inflict upon him the strict penalty which that sin deserved. It is not strange that pressed by the difficulties of such theories, so many have been led to adopt the more rational and scriptural theory that Christ did not literally bare our sins, nor suffer our punishment; but that his sufferings were a substitute for our punishment, answered the same moral and governmental ends, as the penalty would if inflicted on us.

¹ Bod. Div. p. 732.

(a) On his *love*. It lessens it: "God loved Peter no more than Judas, nor the saints in heaven any more than the damned in hell, since they were equally redeemed by Christ." It also makes his love mutable; since at one time he loves men with so intense love, as to give his Son to die for them, and afterwards this love is turned into wrath. (b) "It reflects on his *wisdom*: "Where is his wisdom in forming a scheme which fails of its end," "which is not and cannot be carried into execution, at least as to some considerable part of it." (c) It reflects on his *justice*: it is unjust to punish twice for the same offence, or exact the same debt twice,—once of the surety and again of the debtor. If then Christ has borne the punishment, or paid the debts of all men, it cannot be just in God to punish them forever. (d) It reflects on his *power*: "as if he was not able to carry his designs into execution." ¹

2. The Universal scheme reflects on the grace and work of Christ. It implies that he loves some enough to die for them, from whom he withholds saving grace. It implies that by his work of satisfaction, "God is only made reconcilable, not reconciled, nor men reconciled to him." It separates his work of redemption from his work of intercession." He died for them, for whom he would not pray." ²

3. "Other arguments against universal redemption, may be taken from the *uselessness* of it:" (a) "to those whose sins are irremissible;" (b) "to those who are never favored with the means of grace;" (c) it affords no encouragement to faith and hope in Christ, since men may be redeemed by him and yet perish. (d) To the saved, it affords no cause for thankfulness to Christ, "since the difference between them and others is not owing to the efficacy of his death, but to their own wills and works." ³

Our author easily disposes of those passages of Scripture "which at first sight seem to countenance the Universal scheme." 1. Those in which the words *all* and *every one* are used, where the death of Christ and the benefits of it are spoken of." Luke 11: 10, 11. John 12: 32. Rom. 5: 18.

¹ Bod. Div. B. 3, Ch. 3.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

2 Cor. 5: 13. Heb. 2: 9. 2 Pet. 3: 9. In passages of this class, *all* does not mean all mankind, but either all of the class spoken of, all his people, all the elect; or all nations irrespectively.¹

2. Those passages in which the words *world* and *the whole world* are used. John 1: 29 and 3: 16. 2 Cor. 5: 19. 1 John 2: 2. *World*, here, has the same limited meaning as *all* has in the first class of texts.²

3. Those passages which seem to intimate that some may perish for whom Christ died. Rom. 14: 15. 1 Cor. 8: 12. Eternal destruction is not here referred to, but the loss of present peace and comfort, temporal evil.³

More consistent than some who hold to a limited atonement, or a limited redemption, Dr. Gill denies that the work of Christ lays the foundation for the free offer of salvation to all men. "That there are universal offers of grace and salvation to all men, I utterly deny."⁴ "Indeed, the universal offer cannot be supported, without supposing universal salvation."⁵ Accordingly, he severely censures those preachers who freely offer salvation to all. "How irrational is it for ministers to stand offering Christ, and salvation by him, to men when, on the one hand, they have neither power nor right to give; and, on the other hand, the persons they offer to, have neither power nor will to receive."⁶ "It is not consistent with our ideas of God, that he should send ministers to offer salvation to men, to whom he himself never intended to give it."⁷ "The ministers are κηρυκτες, *criers*, heralds; their business is κηρυσσεν, *to proclaim* aloud, to publish facts, to declare things done, and not to offer them to be done on conditions; as when a peace is concluded and finished, the herald's business is, to proclaim the peace, and not to offer it. Of this nature is the gospel, and the whole system of it, which preaches, not offers, peace by Christ, who is Lord of all."⁸

¹ Bod. Div. B. 3, Ch. 4.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 270.

⁵ Note to Crisp's Sermons, Vol. I. p. 181.

⁶ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 146.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.* p. 147.

Dr. Gill's own practice was strictly accordant with his doctrine on this subject. He nowhere invites men, indiscriminately, to come to Christ and be saved; nowhere pleads with them to become reconciled to God; nowhere charges upon them the guilt of rejecting the Saviour who died for them; nowhere intimates that their salvation is, in any sense, or in any way, dependent on their choice or conduct. As a herald, he simply proclaims the fact, that Christ has redeemed the elect, and that they can and will be saved.

By a happy inconsistency, due to the impulses of a warm heart, some advocates of a limited atonement, do preach a free gospel. The false logic of the study yields to the sanctified ardor of the pulpit. Thus even Dr. Crisp, in one instance, speaks of "the general tender of the gospel," and exhorts his hearers thus: "Say unto your souls (and let not this be contradicted, seeing Christ hath reached out himself to sinners, as sinners), My part is as good as any man's; set down, and rest here, question it not, but believe it." But Dr. Gill criticises this passage, and says, it cannot be vindicated from the charge of the Dutch Professor Hoornbeeck, that "it implies that he held the universal satisfaction of Christ for all, and that all have an equal portion in it."¹ With a stern consistency, Dr. Gill went so far as to deny that the non-elect are on probation. No atonement having been made for them, their salvation is already a fixed impossibility, and therefore they cannot be on trial with reference to it. Indeed, he denies that even the elect are, in any proper sense, on probation. Their failure of salvation is as fixed an impossibility as is the salvation of the non-elect.²

VIII. *Justification.*

Dr. Gill distinguishes between *active* and *passive* justification. The former is an immanent act of God; the latter is that act considered as terminating on the believer. Ac-

¹ Notes to Crisp's Sermons, Vol. I. p. 181.

² Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 153.

tive justification is eternal and unconditional. "As God's will to elect is the election of his people, so his will to justify them, is the justification of them." "It is an act of his grace towards them, entirely resides in the Divine mind, and lies in his estimating and accounting them righteous, through the righteousness of Christ; and as such, it did not first commence in time, but in eternity."¹ "Faith is not the cause, but an effect of justification." "The reason why any are justified, is not because they have faith; but the reason why they have faith, is because they are justified."² "Sound Protestant divines understand the phrase ["justified by faith"] in an improper, tropical, or metonymical sense, and say that faith intends neither the habit nor the act of faith, but the object of faith, that is, Christ."³ This eternal, unconditional justification was, with our author, the only real and proper justification." "That justification which is by, and at, or upon believing, is not properly justification, but the manifestation of it."⁴ It was their mode of presenting this subject of eternal justification, which, more than anything else, subjected Dr. Gill and those whose views coincided with his, to the charge of Antinomianism. In preaching, they never exhort their hearers to faith in Christ as being, in any sense, the instrument or condition of their justification. Their general style of speaking on the subject is strikingly in contrast with that of Luther and the Reformers, to say nothing of that of the apostles and of Christ himself.

IX. *Regeneration.*

Regeneration is distinguished from conversion. The former is "the sole act of God;" the latter "consists both of God's act upon men in turning them, and of acts done by men under the influence of converting grace: they turn, being turned." "Regeneration is the motion of God towards and upon the heart of the sinner; conversion is the motion

¹ Bod. Div. p. 332.

² Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 171.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

of a sinner towards God." "In regeneration, men are wholly passive; as they also are in the first moment of conversion, but by it become active."¹ "Regeneration is an irresistible act of God's grace: no more resistance can be made to it, than there could be by the first matter in its creation, or by a dead man in his resurrection."² This author denies any proper instrumentality of truth in regeneration. "This instrumentality of the word, in regeneration, seems not so agreeable to the principle of grace, implanted in the soul in regeneration, and to be understood with respect to that, since that is done by immediate infusion, and is represented as a creation; and now as God made no use of any instrument in the first and old creation, neither does it seem so agreeable, that he should use any in the new creation, where this is rather to be understood of the exertion of the principle of grace, and the drawing it forth into act and exercise."³

In conversion, the truth is the instrumental cause, or means, though not sufficient of itself, and is efficacious only when made so by the Spirit.⁴ Conversion and regeneration, according to Dr. Gill, are, both alike, utterly beyond the power of man, and are not matters of duty, for not doing which he will be punished.

"The things spiritually good, which man cannot do, have been instanced, as to convert and regenerate himself, to believe in Christ, and repent of sin, in an evangelical manner; and these are things which he is not obliged to do

¹ Bod. Div. p. 263.

² Ibid. p. 849. Dr. Crisp says there is a twofold reciprocity of Christ, a passive and an active reciprocity. "A passive receiving of Christ is just such a receiving of him as when a froward patient takes a purge or some bitter physic, he shuts his teeth against it, and the physician forceth his mouth open and pours it down his throat, and so it works against his will by the overruling power of one over him, that knows it is good for him. So Christ comes, by the gift of the Father, to a person whilst he is in the stubbornness of his own heart, being froward and cross, and the Father forces open the spirit of that man and pours in his own Son in spite of the receiver."—Crisp's Sermons, Vol. I. p. 168. In a note, Dr. Gill calls this "an excellent distinction," and approves the illustration of the sinner's passivity in receiving Christ.

³ Bod. Div. p. 844.

⁴ Ibid. p. 870.

of himself, and will not be damned for not performing them."¹

To the objection that, in some passages of Scripture sinners are exhorted to repent and turn from their sins, he replies, that these passages either refer to external reformation, or else are designed to convince sinners of the necessity of conversion, and make them sensible of their impotence to convert themselves.²

X. *Saints' Perseverance.*

"The grace of regeneration can never be lost; once regenerated, and always so; one that is born, in a spiritual sense, can never be unborn again."³ This doctrine, Dr. Gill says, "is written as with a sunbeam in the sacred Scriptures, having so large a compass of proof as scarce any other doctrine has."⁴ Besides the direct teachings of the Bible, it may be proved from the perfections of God, especially from his immutable purposes and his justice. All who are regenerated, are elect, and "the decree of election is unalterable and irreversible."⁵ All who are regenerated are also redeemed by Christ, and "the justice of God requires that those should be certainly and eternally saved, for whose sins Christ has died, and for which he has made satisfaction, by suffering the punishment due unto them; it is contrary to the justice of God to punish sin twice, once in the Surety, and again in the redeemed."⁶

XI. *The Second Coming of Christ.*

The unimaginative expositor naturally inclines to a too literal interpretation of the figurative portions of the Scriptures; with him, imagery is apt to become doctrine; symbol, substance; rhetoric, logic. This was manifestly the case, to some extent, with Dr. Gill. His literalism is apparent throughout his writings; and, as might be expected, led him

¹ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. II. p. 152. ² Bod. Div. p. 868. ³ Ibid. p. 850.

⁴ Sermons and Tracts, Vol. III. p. 230. ⁵ Ibid. p. 245. ⁶ Ibid. p. 248.

to hold and advocate the doctrine of Christ's literal and personal coming to reign on the earth. According to his method of interpretation, patriarchs and prophets, angels and apostles, and Christ himself, all bear testimony to the truth of this doctrine.¹

The manner of his coming. He will not descend upon the earth at once, when he appears from the third heavens; but he will "descend into the air, and there stay a time, until the saints are raised, and the living are changed, and both brought up unto him there; and until the new earth is made and prepared for him and for them; when he and they will come down from heaven to earth, and they shall reign with him, on it, a thousand years."²

The visibility of Christ at his coming. "He will appear in human nature, visible to all." "Such will be the agility of his glorious body that he will swiftly move from one end of the heaven to the other, like lightning, to which he is compared, Matt. 24: 27, so that he will be seen by all the tribes, kindreds, and nations of the earth."³

The time of his coming. "To put a stop to inquiries of this kind, or at least a boundary to them, it should be observed what our Lord says: 'Of that day and hour knoweth no man, no not the angels, but my Father only.'" "Some good men, in the last age, fixed the time of Christ's second coming, of his personal reign, and the millennium; in which being mistaken, it has brought the doctrine into disgrace."⁴ "It seems impracticable and impossible to know the time of the second coming of Christ, and therefore it must be vain and needless, if not criminal, to inquire into it."⁵

The effects of Christ's second coming. (1) The resurrection of the just.⁶ (2) The burning of the world, 2 Pet. 3: 10—12. (3) The making of new heavens and a new earth, 2 Pet. 3: 13. Isa. 65: 17." "These passages are to be understood, not in a figurative, but in a literal sense;" not as referring to "the gospel dispensation;" nor to "the spiritual reign of Christ, when the gospel shall be preached to all

¹ Bod. Div. B. 4 Ch. 5.

² Ibid. p. 978.

³ Ibid. p. 979.

⁴ Ibid. p. 981.

⁵ Ibid. p. 983.

⁶ Ibid. p. 985.

nations, and the earth be filled with the knowledge of God;" nor to "the heavenly state or ultimate glory;" but "to the natural heavens and earth." "The new heavens are not the starry heavens, but the airy heavens only; which will be purged, purified, and refined by fire, and become a new air, healthful and salubrious, free from all noxious vapors and exhalations, and all unhealthful fogs, mists, and meteors, watery and fiery." "Moreover, the air will be cleared of devils, which have their residence in it."¹ "The new earth will be this earth refined and renewed, and restored to its paradisaical state." "It shall no more bring forth thorns and thistles, nor require labor and pains to cultivate it." "There shall be no more curse, Rev. 22: 3."² (4) The millennium, or the personal reign of Christ upon the earth a thousand years. "The time is literally and definitely one thousand years, Rev. 20: 5; because (a) There is no necessity for interpreting the phrase "thousand years" figuratively. (b) It is so often repeated, six times in all, vs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7. (c) An emphasis is put upon the phrase: four times the article is used, τὰ χίλια ἔτη, 'these thousand years;' these emphatically, these precise thousand years." (d) "The parts to which this number is applied are so cemented and bound together, as cause and effect," as to strengthen the proof that just a thousand years is meant. "They are bounded by the binding of Satan at the beginning of them, and by the loosing of him at the end of them (ver. 27); and they are bounded by two resurrections; by the first resurrection of the saints and by the second resurrection of the wicked."³

The final destiny of the earth. Will it be annihilated at the expiration of the thousand years? "My mind has been at uncertainty about the matter, sometimes inclining one way, and sometimes another." "But my last and present thoughts are that it will continue for ever." "I am of opinion, therefore, that the new earth will be a sort of an apartment to heaven, whither the saints will pass and repass at their pleasure."⁴

¹ Bod. Div. p. 1005. ² Ibid. p. 1006. ³ Ibid. pp. 1037, 1038. ⁴ Ibid. p. 1047.

XII. *Eschatology.*

The immortality of the soul. Dr. Gill held that this doctrine could be proved independently of the Scriptures: from the nature of the soul, as spiritual and simple; as possessing faculties and powers, but partially developed in this life; and aspirations after happiness, which are never satisfied; from the consent of all nations; from the natural repugnance of men to annihilation; from the disposition of all men to have some religion; from the fears awakened by a guilty conscience; and from the unequal distribution of rewards and punishments in this life.¹

The intermediate state. "The soul, immediately after death, enters into a state of happiness or woe, in which it continues, until the resurrection of the body; and during that interval, it is not in a state of insensibility and inactivity." "The happiness of the saints is not complete, nor the misery of the wicked proportionate to their crimes, without their resurrection-bodies."²

The resurrection of the body. "This is most certainly a doctrine of pure revelation." "But though above reason, it is not contrary to it." "It is entirely agreeable to the perfections of God." There will be a difference between the resurrection of the righteous and the wicked. "The righteous will rise first, at the appearance [second coming] of Christ; the wicked, not till a thousand years after. Saints will rise by virtue of their union to Christ; the wicked, merely by his power."³

The general judgment. There will be a particular judgment of men immediately after death, when each soul will be adjudged either to happiness or woe.⁴ But after the resurrection of the body, there will be a general judgment. On this subject, Dr. Gill's views conform to his premillenarian theory. "The righteous will be judged, first, alone."⁵ They will be raised and judged at the commencement of the

¹ Bod. Div. B 4, Ch. 2.² Ibid. p. 957.³ Ibid. p. 961.⁴ Ibid. p. 1040.⁵ Ibid. p. 1057.

millennium, and the wicked at its close.¹ To the objection that, according to this view, there will be two days of judgment, our author replies : “ not at all ; there will be but one day of judgment, but it will be a long one ; not a natural day, consisting of twenty-four hours.” “ This day of the Lord will be a thousand years, for which reason it is called a *great* day.” “ The judgment of the righteous will proceed at the beginning of the thousand years, and continue in them ; and during this time, things will be preparing for the judgment of the wicked, at the close of them, and so things will go on successively, till the whole is finished ; as the resurrection of the just will be on the morning of this day, so will their judgment begin then ; and as the resurrection of the wicked will be at the evening of this day, so likewise their judgment ; and as the evening and the morning make but one day, so it will be in this case ; there will be but one day of judgment.”²

The *place* of judgment is uncertain. “ Some think it will be in the air, because the Judge will come in the clouds of heaven.” “ But I rather think it will be on the earth.”³

The eternal punishment of the wicked. This doctrine is not only taught in the Bible, but it may be proved from the justice of God. (a) Though sin is a finite action, “ yet it is objectively infinite, as committed against an infinite Being,” and therefore it deserves an infinite punishment ; “ and since infinite punishment cannot be inflicted *intensively* on a finite creature, it must be inflicted *extensively*, or continued ad infinitum.”⁴ (b) “ The wicked, in the future state, will always continue sinning ; and therefore, as they will sin continually, it will be just that they be punished continually.”⁵

The happiness of saints in heaven. Will there be a difference in the degree of it, or will all be equally happy ? Dr. Gill thinks that “ the arguments against degrees in glory preponderate,” and that all will be upon a level. He also argues against the theory of progress or advancement in glory and happiness. “ If any addition is gradually made

¹ Bod. Div. p. 1058.

² Ibid. p. 1059.

³ Ibid. p. 1063.

⁴ Ibid. p. 1078.

⁵ Ibid. p. 547.

to the happiness of the saints in heaven, it must be imperfect until that addition is made ; which does not seem consistent with the perfection of their state."¹

ARTICLE VI.

○ SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE. NUMBER III.

WITH REMARKS ON THE "SIX DAYS OF CREATION" AND THE "WORLD-PROBLEM" OF PROF. TAYLER LEWIS.²

By Professor James D. Dana, Yale College.

SCIENCE AND THE BIBLE,—the first and the second revelation ; the one telling of God's wisdom and power, and his plan of creation ; the other declaring God's holiness and love, his majesty as the Infinite King, his condescension as a Redeemer : the one proffering aid to physical and intellectual man ; the other meeting the highest wants of the soul, and opening to it the light and joy of heaven :—these are the views recognized in our earlier chapters on Science and the Bible.³ Our plan led us to dwell mostly on the earlier revelation, as this is too often misunderstood and depreciated even by men of whom more knowledge might be expected.

But our words have been regarded as an attempted ele-

¹ Bod. Div. pp. 1088, 1089.

² "The Bible and Science, or the World-Problem," by Tayler Lewis, Professor of Greek, Union College. "Cancta fecit bona in tempore suo, et MUNDUM tradidit disputationi eorum, ut non inveniat homo quod operatus est Deus, ab initio usque ad finem."—Ecclesiastes 3: 11. "And there was a voice from the firmament that was over the heads of the living creatures."—Ezekiel 1: 25. 352 pp., 12mo. Schenectady. 1856.

³ In the use of the word science, for nature-science or knowledge, we may seem to be ignoring other branches of science. The fault is in the English language ; for neither *natural science*, *physical science*, or *inductive science* covers the whole range. Besides abundant usage, we have the authority of the Preface and various other parts of the "Six Days of Creation." We were satisfied, therefore, that we should be rightly interpreted.